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SUMMARY 
 
PART 1 
ECB independence and price stability 
The success of the stability oriented monetary policy of the ECB depends on the acceptance 
of the bank’s institutional set-up. In this context, the ECB’s political independence seems to be 
of the utmost importance. However, important pillars for safeguarding the bank’s political 
independence – such as, for instance, governments’ adherence to the European Stability and 
Growth Pact and the acceptance of the division of labor between fiscal and monetary policy – 
have been repeatedly called into question. For instance, calls for a better dialog between fiscal 
and monetary policy may sound well-intentioned at first glance. At second glance, however, 
there should be little doubt that such a cooperation, if put into practice, would run the risk of 
undermining the political independence of the ECB, thereby posing a risk to the stability of 
the euro. That said, the ECB is well advised to continue to reject proposals for a better policy 
mix. – Ongoing and improved explanation of the advantages of having an independent cen-
tral bank is needed to keep alive public support for the current institutional monetary ar-
rangement in the euro area.     
 
PART 2 
Monetary policy and structural reforms  
What role does monetary policy play for structural reform in open economies? Empirical es-
timations were performed with panel data for 23 OECD countries from 1970 to 2000. Struc-
tural reform was measured by the Economic Freedom of the World index, whereas the 
monetary policy constraints were measured by a monetary commitment index and the pre-
vailing exchange rate regime. – Our results provide little evidence for the hypothesis that a 
discretionary monetary policy promotes structural reform and economic freedom. The results 
strongly argue against those views maintaining that a business cycle oriented and lax mone-
tary policy has never and nowhere been detrimental for employment. In fact, our results 
show that discretionary monetary policies tend to lead to a lower degree of structural labor 
market reform and, hence, to lower employment. That said, the ECB should pursue a me-
dium- to long-term oriented monetary policy if it wants to strengthen growth and employ-
ment in the euro area via supporting reforms. 
 
PART 3 
A critical view of the real interest rate concept 
The concept of the neutral (real) interest rate (NRIR) – as implied by the Taylor rule – recom-
mends monetary policy to set real interest rates at a level that closes, or at least smoothes, the 
output gap. We argue that such a policy, if put into practice, would entail substantial pitfalls. 
First, monetary policy is an inadequate tool for influencing real GDP: the central bank’s im-
pact on long-term interest rates and GDP is actually small (or not existing); to make things 
worse, a cyclically oriented policy would provoke the well-known time-lag problem. Second, and 
perhaps most importantly, the NRIR concept is not necessarily compatible with price stabil-
ity, as it ignores the impact of credit and money growth on inflation. – As a result, we are in 
favour of a long-term oriented monetary policy that has a strong focus on money and credit 
growth and asset prices. Such a monetary policy would not only be compatible with the ob-
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jective of price stability. It would also reduce the risk of the economy falling into (a monetary 
induced) financial crisis which, in turn, could have a highly negative impact on output and 
employment. 
 
PART 4 
ECB monetary policy and euro inflation outlook 
Even at a main refinancing rate of 3.25%, ECB monetary policy remains very expansionary. 
We forecast annual HICP inflation in 2007 to be 2.3% on average (including the German 
VAT hike). Due to strong excess liquidity, annual consumer price inflation is likely to remain 
at 2.3% in 2008. We recommend raising ECB rates further to around 4.0%, for reducing 
credit and money supply growth, thereby dampening inflationary pressure. – Our money de-
mand analyses for the euro area suggest that, in recent years, excess liquidity might have been 
translating in great part into asset price inflation rather than consumer price inflation. The re-
sults indicate that headline M3 growth is actually much more closely related to the ongoing loss 
of purchasing of money power of the euro – that is consumer and asset price inflation – than may be 
widely believed. That said, for keeping inflation in check it seems advisable for the ECB to 
set interest rates in line with the signals provided by (trend) money supply (excess liquidity).   
 
[\ 
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Zusammenfassung  
 
TEIL 1 
Herausforderungen für die Unabhängigkeit der EZB 
Der Erfolg der stabilitätsorientieren EZB-Geldpolitik hängt entscheidend von der Einhaltung 
der institutionellen Spielregeln ab. Hierzu zählt insbesondere die Wahrung der politischen Unab-
hängigkeit der EZB. In jüngster Zeit sind jedoch ihre Grundlagen – Befolgen des Stabilitäts-
paktes, Akzeptieren der Eigenständigkeit der Geldpolitik und des EZB-Auftrages durch die 
Regierungen etc. – immer wieder in Frage gestellt worden. Vor allem wohlklingende politische 
Umarmungsversuche in Form der Forderungen, die EZB-Politik müsse besser mit der Finanz- 
und Wirtschaftspolitik koordiniert werden, entpuppen sich bei genauem Hinsehen als Versu-
che, den Unabhängigkeitstatus der EZB zu unterwandern. Soll die Unabhängigkeit der EZB 
gewahrt bleiben, müssen Forderungen nach einem stärkeren Dialog nicht nur strikt zurück-
gewiesen werden. Vielmehr ist auch eine fortwährende öffentliche Aufklärung nötig, um den 
Konsens für die Unabhängigkeit der Notenbanken zu wahren und damit die Aussicht auf 
stabiles Geld zu verbessern.  
 
TEIL 2 
Geldpolitik und Strukturreformen 
Welche Rolle spielt die Geldpolitik für Strukturreformen? Um diese Frage zu beantworten, 
wurden Daten aus 23 OECD-Ländern für die Zeit 1970 bis 2000 unersucht. Der Effekt von 
Strukturreformen wurde dabei anhand des Economic Freedom of the World Index operationali-
siert, die Geldpolitik anhand eines geldpolitischen Regelbindungsindex und dem herrschen-
den Wechselkursregime. Die Ergebnisse der Untersuchung sprechen gegen die häufig geäu-
ßerte Meinung, dass eine laxe, konjunkturorientierte Geldpolitik einen positiven Beitrag zu 
Strukturreformen leistet (Bestätigung der TINA-Hypothese). Als Handlungsempfehlung lässt 
sich für die EZB-Geldpolitik ableiten, dass sie weiterhin eine mittel- bis langfristig orientierte 
Geldpolitik verfolgen sollte, wenn es gilt, Strukturreformen u. a. auf den Arbeitsmärkten – 
und damit letztlich Wachstum und Beschäftigung im Euroraum – zu unterstützen; eine kon-
junkturorientierte Politik wäre kontraproduktiv.  
 
TEIL 3 
Ein kritischer Blick auf das Konzept des „neutralen Zinses“  
Eine Geldpolitik auf Basis des (realen) neutralen Zinses oder Taylor Zinses – wie derzeit in Fach-
kreisen vielfach propagiert – bringt viele Probleme mit sich. Erstens ist der neutrale Zins eine 
gänzlich unbekannte Größe, deren Schätzung erhebliche, wenn nicht gar unüberwindbare 
Schwierigkeiten bereitet. Zweitens werden die Möglichkeiten einer Konjunktursteuerung 
durch die Geldpolitik, auf die das neutrale Zinskonzept setzt, überschätzt. Drittens wird die 
Time-Lag-Problematik übersehen. Viertens ignoriert eine solche Politik, dass die Kredit- und 
Geldmengenexpansion langfristig entscheidende Größen für das Preisniveau darstellt. So 
könnte ein Notenbankzins, der dem neutralen entspricht, dennoch zu Inflation führen. – Wir 
favorisieren daher eine langfristig ausgerichtete EZB-Geldpolitik, die viel stärker als bisher 
das Zusammenspiel von Kreditexpansion, Asset-Preis-Entwicklung und Geldmengenwachs-
tum betrachtet. Solch eine Politik würde nicht nur im Einklang mit Preisniveaustabilität ste-
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hen, sondern auch die Gefahr von Finanzkrisen, die zu schweren Wachstumskrisen werden 
können, abmildern. 
 
TEIL 4 
EZB-Geldpolitik – Rück- und Ausblick 
Die Geldpolitik der EZB ist auch nach den jüngsten Zinsanhebungen auf 3,25% immer noch 
außergewöhnlich expansiv. Die Inflation der Konsumentenpreise dürfte trotz des Ölpreisver-
falls 2007 (einschließlich des deutschen Mehrwertsteuereffekts) bei 2,3% liegen und wegen 
des starken Geldmengenwachstums auch in 2008 bei 2,3% verharren. Wir empfehlen, den 
EZB-Zins weiter anzuheben, um das übermäßige Wachstum der Kredit- und Geldmengen 
und damit den Inflationsdruck einzudämmen. Dies dürfte einen EZB-Leitzins von ungefähr 
4,0% erforderlich machen. – Unsere Analysen zur Geldnachfrage im Euroraum deuten darauf 
hin, dass die Überschussliquidität sich weniger in Konsumentenpreisen als vielmehr in Vermö-
genspreisen zu entladen scheint (Asset Price Inflation). Die Befunde deuten an, dass der Zu-
sammenhang zwischen Geldmengenwachstum und tatsächlicher Geldentwertungsrate enger zu 
sein scheint, als vielfach angenommen wird. Soll also der Geldwertschwund verhindert wer-
den, d. h. Konsumenten- als auch Vermögenspreisinflation, muss sich die EZB mit ihrer 
Zinspolitik viel enger an den Geldmengensignalen orientieren als sie es bisher getan hat.   
 
[\ 
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PART 1 
Challenges to ECB independence    
 
CONTENT: 1.1 The importance of political independence – 1.2 ECB political independence and in-
volvement with EU institutions. – 1.3 Identifying risks to independence. 
 
SUMMARY: The success of the stability oriented monetary policy of the ECB depends on the acceptance of 
the bank’s institutional set-up. In this context, the ECB’s political independence is of the utmost importance. 
However, important pillars for safeguarding the bank’s independence – such as, for instance, governments’ 
adherence to the European Stability and Growth Pact and the acceptance of the “division of labor” between 
fiscal and monetary policy – have been repeatedly called into question. For instance, latest calls for a better 
dialog between fiscal and monetary policy may sound well-intentioned at first glance. At second glance, how-
ever, it should become clear that any such coordination, if put into practice, would run the risk of undermining 
the political independence of the ECB, thereby posing a risk to the stability of the euro. That said, the ECB 
is well advised to continue to reject proposals for a better “policy mix”. – Ongoing and improved explanation 
of the advantages of having an independent central bank is needed to keep alive public support for the current 
institutional arrangement.     
 
1.1 The importance of political independence  
Price stability has become a widely accepted goal of monetary policy, and an independ-
ent central bank is an institutional arrangement that can help to achieve it. As a result, inde-
pendent central banks have become a major characteristic of government controlled pa-
per money standards in the more recent history. The hallmarks of central bank independ-
ence – that is the autonomy from the government interference in day-to-day policy – were 
identified by David Ricardo in 1824:  
“It is said that Government could not be safely entrusted with the power of issuing paper 
money; that it would most certainly abuse it (…). There would, I confess, be great danger 
of this if Government – that is to say, the Ministers – were themselves to be entrusted with 
the power of issuing paper money. But I propose to place this trust in the hands of Com-
missioners, not removable from their official situation but by a vote of one or both Houses 
of Parliament. I propose also to prevent all intercourse between these Commissioners and 
Ministers, by forbidding any species of money transactions between them. The Commis-
sioners should never, on any pretense, lend money to Government, nor in the slightest de-
gree be under its control or influence (…).”5 
 
TIME INCONSISTENCY 
Theoretically speaking, the notion that monetary policy, if left in the hands of politi-
cians, might be subject to an inflation bias has its root in time-inconsistency, a theoretical con-
                                                 
5 Quoted from Fraser, B. W. (1994), Central Bank Independence: What Does it Mean?, in: Reserve 
Bank of Australia Bulletin, December, pp. 1.  
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cept developed by Kydland and Prescott (1977).6 In a simple model version, it is assumed 
that monetary policy makers favour high employment and dislike deviations of inflation 
from the envisaged rate. What is more, policy makers can act discretionary (or ad hoc), that 
is they can change policy from one period to the other. It is actually discretion on the part of 
policy makers that may result in a conflict between the employment and inflation goal.  
Once market agents have made their contracts on the basis of expected inflation, 
monetary policy may want to deliver higher-than-expected inflation, as by doing so real 
wages can be lowered and output increased. After having suffered from surprise inflation, 
however, market agents would no longer believe in the central bank’s inflation promise; 
the latter would no longer be credible. In fact, people would expect inflation to be higher 
than promised. According to theory, a discretionary monetary policy therefore imparts an 
inflation bias to the economy, and the outcome would clearly be sub-optimal: inflation 
would be higher than needed, without increasing employment.  
Making central banks politically independent is nowadays seen as a measure for cir-
cumventing the time-inconsistency problem, which might arise if and when governments 
are allowed to have access to the printing press on a day-to-day basis.7  
 
DIMENSIONS OF INDEPENDENCE 
The discussion about central bank independence tends to focus on two key issues: 
First, there is the dimension that encompasses those institutional characteristics that insu-
late the central bank from political influence in setting the goal of monetary policy. Sec-
ond, there are the dimensions that include those aspects that allow the central bank to 
freely implement policy in pursuit of monetary policy goals. With Debelle and Fischer 
(1994), these two aspects are called goal independence and instrument independence; in this con-
text we also refer to financial independence. 
 Goal independence refers to the central bank’s ability to determine the goals of its policy 
without the direct influence of the government. In the euro area, the ECB’s primary 
objective, that is price stability, is laid out in Article 105 (1) of the Maastricht Treaty 
(“Treaty”). It is upon the ECB to specify that objective and translate it into an opera-
tional goal. Seen from this viewpoint, the ECB has actually a rather high level of goal 
independence.   
 Instrument independence refers to the central bank’s ability to freely adjust its policy tools 
in pursuit of the goals of monetary policy. The ECB has all instruments (open mar-
ket instruments, lending and deposit interest rates, etc.) at its disposal which are 
widely seen as a prerequisite for determining credit and money supply in the euro 
area.  
                                                 
6 It was applied to the problem of monetary policy by Barro, R., Gordon, D. (1983), A Positive The-
ory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model, in: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 91, pp. 589 – 
610.  
7 For a critical look at solving the inflation bias by central bank independence, see, for instance, Fuh-
rer, J. C. (1997), Independence and Inflation Targeting: Monetary Policy Paradigms for the Next Mil-
lennium, in: New England Economic Review, January/February, pp. 19 – 36. 
 
 Money matters for inflation in the euro area  
_____________________________________________________________________________________________  
9
 Financial independence shall guarantee that the central bank is financially autonomous. 
This, in turn, shall allow the bank to, for instance, hire staff and pursue research pro-
jects without having to seek government approval.  
What is more, stable money requires sound public finances. Fiscal policies can under-
mine confidence in a stability-oriented monetary policy if private agents come to expect 
that excessive government borrowing will ultimately be financed through money creation 
(inflation tax). The European Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which was adopted in 
1997, is a rule-based mechanism for constraining fiscal policies via rules, as it lies in the 
temptation for governments to spend more than they can afford and pass the burden 
onto future taxpayers.8  
 
1.2 ECB political independence and involvement with EU insti-
tutions 
POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE 
The ECB has been granted full institutional independence by the Treaty.9 The latter 
explicitly stipulates that neither the ECB nor any member of its decision-making bodies 
shall seek or take instructions from Community institutions or bodies, from any govern-
ment of a Member State or from any other body. The Community institutions and bodies 
and the governments of the Member States have undertaken to respect this principle and 
not to seek to influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB in the 
performance of their tasks.  
The concept of independence was further specified by the European Monetary Insti-
tute in its Convergence Report (March 1998), which was endorsed by the ECOFIN 
Council in its recommendation to the Council under Article 109 j (2), last paragraph, of 
the Treaty. Independence means financial and institutional independence (as outlined 
above). The Treaty establishes that the ECB has its own budget, independent from that of 
the European Union. This makes it impossible for Community institutions to interfere 
with the administration of the ECB and keeps the budget separate from the financial in-
terests of the Community.  
The Statute protects the personal independence of the members of the ECB’s decision-
making bodies, stipulating: 
 a minimum renewable term of office of five years for governors of the national cen-
tral banks;  
                                                 
8 In a monetary union among sovereign states, the deficit bias of fiscal policy is likely to be exacer-
bated. The adoption of a common currency eliminates the exchange rate risk and the associated inter-
est rate risk premia among the participant countries, thus blunting the discipline normally exerted by 
financial markets on governments’ fiscal behaviour. As national financial markets become more inte-
grated, sovereign issuers can draw on a larger and more liquid currency area-wide capital market. A 
government that increases its deficit will be able to finance the additional expenditure more easily be-
cause the cost of the additional borrowing in terms of higher interest rates is, at least partly, spread 
across the entire currency area. See, ECB (2004), Fiscal policy influences on macroeconomic stability 
and prices, in: Monthly Bulletin April, pp. 45 – 58.  
9 See ECB (1999), The institutional framework of the European System of Central Banks, in: Monthly 
Bulletin July, pp. 55 – 63.  
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 a non-renewable term of office of eight years for members of the Executive Board, a 
system of staggered appointments having been applied for the appointment of its 
first members;  
 removal from office only in the event of incapacity or serious misconduct; and  
 competence of the European Court of Justice to settle any disputes in these matters. 
Further provisions supporting to the ECB’s political independence (and, at the same 
time, contributing to fiscal discipline) are the prohibitions of monetary financing of 
budget deficits and of any form of privileged access for the public sector. Article 101 of 
the Treaty forbids the ECB and the NCBs to provide monetary financing for public defi-
cits using “overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the ECB or with the 
central banks of the Member States”. Article 102 of the Treaty prohibits any measure that 
may establish privileged access to financial institutions for governments and Community 
institutions or bodies. In addition to increasing the incentives to pursue sound public fi-
nances and prudent fiscal policies, these provisions contribute to the credibility of the sin-
gle monetary policy in the pursuit of price stability.  
Moreover, the Statute enables the ECB to adopt autonomous rules for its personnel, 
prohibiting other Community institutions from having any influence on the conditions of 
employment for staff of the ECB. The institutional independence is established in the 
provisions already mentioned. Furthermore, the competence of the European Court of 
Auditors has been limited to an examination of the operational efficiency of the manage-
ment of the ECB, while the accounts of the ECB are audited by independent external 
auditors.  
 Money matters for inflation in the euro area  
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Figure 1.1. – Official involvements of the ECB with EU institutions 
 
Source: ECB (2000), The ECB’s relations with institutions and bodies of the European Community, in: 
Monthly Bulletin October, pp. 49 – 64 (62).  
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Figure 1.2. – Involvement of high-ranking ECB officials 
 
Source: ECB (2000), The ECB’s relations with institutions and bodies of the European Community, in: 
Monthly Bulletin October, pp. 63.  
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ECB POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT WITH EU INSTITUTIONS  
The ECB has a variety of political involvements with institutions and bodies of the 
Community. Such an involvement is based, on the one hand, on its statutory obligations, 
since the Treaty itself provides for a number of forms of interaction between the ECB 
and other policy-makers of the EU, ranging from consultation to policy dialogue and 
regulatory competences. On the other hand, the ECB’s relations with the institutions and 
bodies of the Community are motivated on functional grounds, in that contacts with 
other policy-makers contribute towards the proper fulfilment of the ECB’s functions and 
tasks.  
At the same time, the specific institutional status of the ESCB and the ECB, notably 
their independent status and primary objective of maintaining price stability, are expected 
to set clear parameters for the degree of any such involvement. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 pro-
vide an overview about the manifold involvements of the ECB with EU institutions. 
Taken as a whole, the involvement of the ECB with EU institutions, especially those of 
high-ranking ECB decision makers, appears to be relatively broad based.    
 
1.3 Identifying risks to political independence  
Looking at the more recent past, there were a number of developments which could 
suggest a growing disrespect for the (very pillars of the) political independence status of 
the ECB. Any violation of these pillars could, if left unattended, weaken the bank’s ability 
to deliver stable money going forward. In what follows, we will note some of these chal-
lenges.  
 
CHALLENGES 
Lack of structural reforms. An ongoing lack of structural reforms, accompa-
nied by lacklustre output and employment gains, would most likely provoke calls for a 
policy of easy money. In fact, ongoing high unemployment and disappointing income 
gains could even erode the consensus for having a price stability oriented monetary 
policy in the euro area: hoped for output gains from an expansionary monetary policy 
might supersede the currently prevailing consensus that inflation has to be avoided, as 
it is a societal evil.  
CALLS FOR POLICY COORDINATION. In April 2006, Jean Claude Juncker and EU 
Commissioner Joachim Almunia wrote a letter to ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet, 
demanding frequent meetings with the openly declared objective of seeking an ex ante 
coordination between fiscal and monetary policy (FAZ, 12 June 2006, p. 2). There 
should be little doubt that such a coordination would, if put into practice, be associ-
ated with the risk of undermining the political independence of the ECB 
Under such an arrangement the ECB would most likely be asked to deliver a 
growth supporting policy, that is lowering rates against the fiscal authorities’ promise of 
reigning in government spending. However, do fiscal authorities really have an incen-
tive to deliver on such a promise after the central bank has lowered rates? Without a 
binding pre-commitment on the part of fiscal authorities it would actually be naive on 
Money matters for inflation in the euro area 
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the part of the central bank to enter such a trade: the teachings of time-inconsistency 
would strongly argue against it (see box below).  
In addition, it is highly questionable as to whether monetary policy would actually 
be in a position to exert a systematic impact on growth and employment – that is 
benefit growth and employment other than by safeguarding the value of the currency. 
Having said, it has to be welcomed that ECB President Trichet, in the June 2006 ECB 
Press conference and also before the EU Parliament, openly rejected Mr Juncker’s 
calls for closer coordination between ECB policy and other policy fields of the EU.  
 
To co-operate or not to co-operate? 
The pros and cons of co-operation between monetary and fiscal policy is nowadays 
examined by taking recourse to game theory.10 Here it can be shown that, under specific 
conditions, co-operative solutions lead to better outcomes for all players. The absence of 
co-operation, in turn, may lead to struggles and inconsistent policies.11  
Co-operative games can take place if players are able to commit themselves to bind-
ing agreements before executing their strategies. However, co-operative games are diffi-
cult to implement between monetary and fiscal authorities, especially so if the latter are 
independent and might not be willing to pre-commit to politically unfavourable policies.12  
The literature has also analysed pre-commitment strategies that may enable to safe-
guard independence while allowing for co-operation. One element of this strategy is to at-
tribute clear objectives to monetary and fiscal authorities. Price stability is generally as-
sumed to be the primary objective of monetary policy. However, it is much more difficult 
to devise a comparably clear objective for fiscal authorities. 
Perhaps most importantly in this context, most studies assume that there is a well-
meaning government, made up of politicians who are assumed to pursue the objective of 
maximising public welfare. In practice, however, isn’t it more reasonable to characterize poli-
ticians, especially those who are subject to the re-election restriction, as individual vote maximiz-
ers? Taking such a starting point, most of the claims put forward in favour of improved 
cooperation between monetary and fiscal policy would no longer be convincing from a 
welfare enhancing point of view.   
What is more, the theoretical work about optimizing monetary and fiscal cooperation 
usually assumes that monetary policy can exert a systematic impact on growth and employ-
ment. However, there are also plenty of other theoretical considerations which would ar-
gue in the opposite. Take, for instance, Robert E. Lucas model of the ineffectiveness of 
monetary (and fiscal) policy under rational expectations. Here, policies do not have any 
systematic impact on the real economy.  
                                                 
10 For an overview, see, for instance, Blackburn, K., Christensen, M. (1989), Monetary Policy and Policy 
Credibility: Theories and Evidence, in: Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 27, pp. 1 – 45. 
11 See Blinder, A. (1982), Issues in the Coordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policies, NBER Working Pa-
per, No. 982. For problems of co-ordination, see Sargent, T., Wallace, R. (1981), Some Unpleasant 
Monetarist Arithmetics, in: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Review, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 1 – 17 for the 
implications on the consistency of policies.  
12 See Persson, T., Tabellini G. (1995), Double-Edged Incentives: Institutions and PolicyCoordina-
tion, in: Grossman G., Rogoff K. (eds.), Handbook of International Economics Vol. III (Amsterdam, 
North Holland). 
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REPEATED CALLS FOR COOPERATION, REPEATED REJECTIONS. Ongoing calls for 
policy coordination, however, might become particularly problematic for the ECB 
(especially from a presentational point of view). Calls for policy coordination might be 
perceived in public as a well-intentioned attempt to improve macroeconomic policies. 
As a result, repeated rejections of such proposals by the ECB might arouse the im-
pression that the central bank would deliberately resist a growth-friendly policy. This 
could, over time, undermine public support for an independent central bank – espe-
cially when output and employment gains remain disappointing.  
CALLS FOR CHANGING THE ECB OBJECTIVE. On various occasions, (leading) 
politicians from euro area countries have been calling for changing the ECB’s primary 
objective, that is maintaining price stability. For instance, the French politician Nicolas 
Sarkozy represents a case in point (FAZ, 24 June 2006, p. 14).  
By doing so, the ECB’s objective of price stability is cast as being an end in itself 
(final target) rather than a means to an end (intermediate target): as many studies show, 
low and stable inflation make a positive contribution to the functioning of the price 
mechanism, thereby allowing an efficient allocation of scarce resources which, in turn, 
support investment, growth and employment. So it would actually be counterproduc-
tive if the public at large would perceive the price stability mandate as running counter 
to the growth and employment objective.  
ATTEMPTS FOR CHANGING THE ECB STATUS IN THE EU CONSTITUTION. The 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (European Constitution) was agreed upon 
by the Heads of State or Government of the European Union (EU) during their meeting 
of 17 to 18 June 2004 in Brussels. In its first draft, price stability did not rank among the 
policy objectives of the EU (but was merely stated as an objective of the ECB). Only after 
strong criticism – especially from the Deutsche Bundesbank –the draft was amended ac-
cordingly. The incident may be taken as an indication that the independence status of the 
ECB might not always and everywhere be accepted.    
WATERING DOWN THE EUROPEAN STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT. The Stability 
and Growth Pact, which was adopted in 1997, sought to strengthen fiscal discipline. 
In November 2003, the ECOFIN Council decided not to act upon the EU Commis-
sion recommendations to move to the next steps of the Early Deficit Procedure 
(EDP) for France and Germany and instead adopted “conclusions” putting the proce-
dures in abeyance subject to certain undertakings by the countries concerned.13 The dete-
rioration of budgetary positions in recent years and the increasing reluctance to follow 
agreed rules and procedures eroded confidence in the EU fiscal framework and intensi-
fied criticisms of the SGP that have been voiced ever since its inception.  
In addition to the external challenges noted above, the ECB itself may have taken a 
decision that might, over the medium- to long-run, weaken its independence status.  
                                                 
13 For an overview about the reform of the SGP, see ECB (2005), The reform of the stability and 
growth pact, in: Monthly Bulletin August, pp. 59 – 73. 
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DOWNGRADING THE MONETARY PILLAR. In its strategy review on 8 May 2003, the 
ECB de facto downgraded the role of money in its strategy by making it a mere infor-
mation variable rather than preserving it as an indicator variable of its policy strategy. In 
this context it should be noted that a prominent role for money serves a number of 
purposes.  
Firstly, it contributes to the stabilisation of market agents’ expectations as the central 
bank’s reaction function becomes more transparent. Secondly, the central bank can signal 
to wage negotiation partners the amount of money it is willing to provide, thereby setting 
a strict limit for the funding of nominal wage increases through monetary policy. Thirdly, 
the pre-announcement of money growth enhances the accountability of monetary policy. 
And fourthly, a prominent role for money would provide the ECB with a shield against po-
litical pressure to trade off price stability against growth.  
Without having established credit and money supply as key variables for a central 
bank’s interest rate policy, there is not only the risk that policy mistakes might lead to infla-
tion. On top of that, it might become increasingly difficult for monetary policy makers to 
reject political calls for an easier monetary policy – especially in periods in which there is a 
growing public willingness – motivated by populist short-term/short-sighted views – to 
trade off stable money against higher growth and employment.  
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
Looking at its track record, government controlled money can hardly be called a suc-
cess story; only in recent years has worldwide (consumer price) inflation declined to more 
acceptable levels (see Figure 1.3.1). So it is certainly justified that in his work Denationaliza-
tion of Money, Friedrich August von Hayek reminds the reader that the history of govern-
ment controlled money is indeed one of relentless falsehood and fraud.14  
 
Figure 1.3.1. – Consumer price inflation (% y/y) 
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Source: OECB (via Bloomberg); own calculations. – Period: January 1971 to August 2006.  
                                                 
14 Hayek, F. A. von (1977), Entnationalisierung des Geldes, Tübingen, Verlag J. C. B. Mohr (Paul 
Siebeck), pp. 11 – 12).  
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In view of the risks associated with today’s government run paper money stan-
dard, Milton Friedman wrote: “(…) a world monetary system has emerged that has no 
historical precedent: a system in which every major currency in the world is, directly or 
indirectly, on an irredeemable paper money stand – directly, if the exchange the ex-
change rate of the currency is flexible though possibly manipulated; indirectly, if the 
currency is unified with another fiat-based currency (…). The ultimate consequences 
of this development are shrouded in uncertainty.”15 
Given the rather costly inflationary experience with government controlled money, 
and, in particular, the ongoing conflict between stable money and governments’ short-
term interests, central bank independence seems to be an important ingredient for a 
credible monetary framework. As long as there is no other institutional arrangement avail-
able, which might solve inflation bias satisfactorily, it appears prudent to appreciate and 
preserve the concept of central bank independence.  
That said, it appears to be productive to unmask, even at an early stage, any attempts 
which might compromise the independence status of the ECB. This can be best be done 
by, as we think, open public discourse. In this sense, William Poole notes: “We should not, 
however, take that fact [central bank independence, the authors] as reason to assume that the 
issue is settled. We are bound to face stresses in the future when many will question these principles. 
Stating them now, defending them and explaining them, is our best hope for improving public under-
standing and maintaining the progress of recent years that is so evident to all central banks and stu-
dents of central banking.”16  
 
[\ 
 
 
                                                 
15 Friedman, M. (1992), Money Mischief, Episodes in Monetary History, San Diego, New York, Lon-
don, p. 249.  
16 Poole, W. (2002), Institutions for Stable Prices: How to Design an Optimal Central Bank, First 
Conference of the Monetary Stability Foundation 
at the Regional Office of the Deutsche Bundesbank, December 2 
(http://stlouisfed.org/news/speeches/2002/12_05_02.html).  
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PART 2 
Monetary policy and structural reforms     
 
CONTENT: 2.1 Monetary policy autonomy and structural reforms – the underlying theory – 2.2 Exten-
sion to the open economy – 2.3 Empirical analysis and policy conclusions 
 
SUMMARY: What role does monetary policy play for structural reform in open economies? Empirical es-
timations were performed with panel data for 23 OECD countries from 1970 to 2000. Structural reform 
was measured by the Economic Freedom of the World index, whereas the monetary policy constraints were 
measured by a monetary commitment index and the prevailing exchange rate regime. – Our results provide 
little evidence to the hypothesis that monetary autonomy promotes structural reform and economic freedom. 
The results also strongly argue against those views maintaining that a discretionary and lax monetary policy 
has never and nowhere been detrimental for employment. Our results actually show that a discretionary mone-
tary policy tends to lead to a lower degree of structural labor market reforms and, hence, to lower employment. 
Against this backdrop we would like to stress that the ECB should continue a medium- to long-term oriented 
approach if it wants to support growth and employment via structural reforms.  
 
2.1 Monetary policy autonomy and structural reforms – the un-
derlying theory 
The pressing problem of unemployment and the choice of the appropriate mone-
tary policy strategy are crucial challenges in current academic and political debates. Al-
though both issues are usually connected in the public discussions the academic dis-
course had neglected, until the mid-nineties, to provide rational arguments for such an 
interrelation. Until then, the incentives and disincentives for labor, product and finan-
cial market reforms on the one side and the benefits and costs of monetary policy 
rules on the other side had typically been analyzed in isolation.17  
The pros and cons of different monetary policy strategies are usually investigated 
in the framework of Barro and Gordon (1983, 1983a) and Kydland and Prescott 
(1977). Both contributions focus on the time inconsistency of discretionary monetary 
policy (which presupposes monetary policy autonomy) and compare the efficiency of 
alternative monetary policy rules with the potential losses due to the inflexibility of 
rules under exogenous shocks. As possible solutions to the trade-off between the 
time-inconsistency problem of discretionary monetary policy and the inflexibility of 
rule-based monetary policy, various rules have been proposed. Prominent examples of 
such limitations of policy autonomy are feedback-rules in connection with distinct 
commitment technologies, e.g. the independence of central banks or incentive 
schemes for central bankers (Walsh, 1995; Persson and Tabellini, 1993; Svensson, 
1997).  
However, the first-best solution to the time-inconsistency problem is to remove 
labor market rigidities, the fundamental cause of high structural unemployment 
                                                 
17 The contents of this chapter heavily relies on Belke, Herz and Vogel (2006).  
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(Svensson, 1997: 104, 109; Duval and Elmeskov, 2005: 5).18 Yet, such a proposal could 
be regarded as rather naive from a public choice perspective, which emphasizes that 
labor market institutions, as an outcome of rational political choice, have to be imple-
mented in the loss function of politicians. In this chapter, we argue that the design of 
labor market institutions can be interpreted as the result of utility maximizing political 
decisions. Therefore, it appears useful to augment the time-inconsistency models by 
an explicit consideration of labor market reforms.  
Cross-country event studies are one way to empirically examine the impact of 
monetary policy strategies on the degree of economic reform in general. This ap-
proach has produced contradicting results, however. The U.S., e.g., are a monetary un-
ion with labor market institutions that encourage a low natural rate of unemployment. 
The EMS commitment was extremely helpful in fostering the reform process in the 
Netherlands and Denmark. The same holds for Austria under the DM peg (Hochreiter 
and Tavlas, 2005). In contrast, the U.K. and New Zealand experienced extensive labor 
market reforms without adhering to an international exchange rate arrangement. 
Hence, we choose an econometric analysis for a large sample of countries (and a large 
variety of reforms as well). Thereby, we go beyond the EMU case studies by van 
Poeck and Borghijs (2001), Bertola and Boeri (2001), and IMF (2004) which are rare 
examples of empirical investigations in this field.  
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. This section 2.1 discusses the 
main arguments concerning the relationship between monetary policy autonomy and la-
bor market reforms in open economies. Section 2.2 extends the analysis to an open econ-
omy framework. Finally, we also obtain testable hypotheses concerning the impact of 
monetary commitment in general and, more specifically, exchange rate flexibility on re-
forms in general, i.e. beyond pure labor market reforms. Panel estimates of the relation-
ship between the degree of monetary commitment or the exchange rate regime and the 
degree of reforms in different areas are presented in section 2.3. The regressions include a 
set of additional variables and extensive robustness checks. Section 2.3 also contains our 
policy conclusions.  
The discussion of the relation between the degree of monetary policy autonomy 
and structural reforms is characterized by a wide spectrum of conflicting views. A 
number of theoretical chapters investigate whether monetary commitments tend to 
strengthen or reduce the degree of reforms. Importantly, most of these arguments are 
derived from reforms of the labor market. We start with a sketch of the literature on 
monetary policy autonomy and reforms and refer to a prominent example of the loss 
of monetary autonomy, i.e. the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates under European 
Monetary Union (EMU). In the run-up to EMU a number of studies tried to assess 
the incentive effects of alternative monetary policy strategies on labor market reforms.  
                                                 
18 OECD (2005) applies a consistent procedure to derive policy priorities to foster growth across 
OECD countries and identifies labor market reforms as being particularly important in, e.g., the Euro 
area. However, this does not at all imply that reforms in other areas are unimportant. Hence, we ana-
lyze a variety of different reform measures in the empirical part. 
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According to the proponents of a liberal view, EMU, as a classical variant of a 
rule-based monetary policy, should have a disciplinary impact on national labor 
markets (Duval and Elmeskov, 2005; Hochreiter and Tavlas, 2005). In the first place, 
EMU enhances the credibility of monetary policy and thereby lowers inflation 
expectations. Negative employment effects as a result of (too) high wage claims can no 
longer be accommodated by discretionary monetary policy. The responsibility of wage 
setters for unemployment increases significantly, because they no longer negotiate 
nominal but real wages. The responsibility for unemployment is more transparently 
assigned to the parties which negotiate the relative price of labor. In contrast, 
autonomous discretionary monetary policy makes it more difficult to remove market 
rigidities because there is still the option to solve or at least to shift the unemployment 
problem onto third parties. i.e. to an expansionary monetary policy.  
Insofar as the single currency increases transparency, the costs of structural 
rigidities, as reflected in relative prices, become more evident. Lower trading costs and 
higher transparency jointly tend to foster competition in goods markets, which in turn 
reduces the available product market rents. If these rents are smaller, the incentives to 
resist reforms that prevent such rents to be captured are smaller as well. Overall, the 
incentives for extensive reforms of labor, goods, and capital markets increase under a 
regime of irrevocably fixed exchange rates (Alogoskoufis, 1994, Calmfors, 1997, Duval 
and Elmeskov, 2005: 6, Mélitz, 1997, and Sibert and Sutherland, 1997). If changes in 
monetary policy and the nominal exchange rate are not available, and if labor is 
immobile as is the case in most parts of the Euro area, there is no other option than to 
undertake reforms in order to facilitate the market-based adjustment to shocks. 
Hence, credible currency pegging has often been interpreted as a version of Mrs. 
Thatcher’s There-Is-No-Alternative (TINA) strategy (Bean, 1998; Calmfors, 1998: 28; 
Saint-Paul and Bentolila, 2000). We intend to extend this TINA argument to countries 
beyond the narrow focus of the Euro area, which is what e.g. Duval and Elmeskov 
(2005) concentrate on.  
However, there are also important arguments against a positive impact of 
monetary rules on economic reform. First, based on OECD macro model simulations 
it was often argued with respect to EMU that the so-called up-front costs of structural 
of labor market reforms may be larger within a currency union. This holds especially 
in large, relatively closed countries for which a real depreciation via lower inflation is 
not so effective in alleviating the necessary “crowding-in” effect. Removing 
restrictions in financial markets tend to stimulate demand more than labor market 
reforms and hence allow an easier and quicker “crowding-in” of reforms (Bean, 1998, 
Duval and Elmeskov, 2005: 10-12, Saint-Paul and Bentolila, 2000). Hence, the prior in 
this case would be that rule-based monetary policy regimes like, e.g., EMU, lead to 
more reforms in the financial market than in the labor market.  
Second, Calmfors (1997) and Sibert and Sutherland (1997) argue that one should 
not expect from monetary policy with its mainly short-run real economy effects to 
diminish structural unemployment significantly. Hence, rule-based monetary policy 
does not necessarily imply more labor market reform pressure. In the same line, 
empirical analysis indicates that the capability of exchange rates to absorb asymmetric 
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shocks to labor and goods markets is rather low. Hence, flexibility of exchange rates 
does not seem to be a good substitute for reforms and, hence, the degree of reforms is 
not necessarily higher under fixed exchange rates (Belke and Gros, 1999).  
Third, some analysts support the view that rule-based monetary policy, at least if 
it takes effect through entering a fixed exchange rate regime, has no disciplinary 
effects on the wage setting process, but leads to centralization processes and a higher 
wage claims on the part of unions. Fourth, the limited evidence of price structure 
convergence for instance among core-EMS countries as compared with other 
countries speaks against any significant impact of credible exchange rate stabilization 
on product market competition. Hence, there are still product market rents to be 
captured and there will still be resistance to reforms (Haffner et al., 2000).  
Fifth, during the discussions about the pros and cons of EMU at the end of the 
nineties it was also argued that market-oriented reforms could achieve a 'double 
dividend' if monetary policy was discretionary (autonomous). As a first effect reforms 
reduce – like a rule-based monetary policy – the costs of structural unemployment. 
They also lessen equilibrium inflation since they diminish the credibility problem of 
discretionary monetary policy. This second effect is absent in the case of rule-based 
monetary policy as a rule-based monetary policy does not suffer from a credibility 
problem by definition (Belke and Kamp, 1999). Hence, our central question relates to 
the correlation between reform intensity and the degree of autonomy of monetary 
policy, which might be determined to a large degree by the exchange rate regime, at 
least if the country is small and open (Duval and Elmeskov, 2005: 9 and 23 ff.). We 
focus on the notion of monetary policy autonomy instead of discretion since we 
consider autonomy as an important prerequisite of discretionary monetary policy. In 
this respect, our approach strictly follows Duval and Elmeskov (2005: 25) who 
measure the loss of autonomy of monetary policy by the degree of participation in any 
kind of fixed exchange rate agreement.  
The usual result of this strand of literature is that for individual member countries 
a fixed exchange rate rule like EMU implies a lower degree of reforms than an 
autonomous monetary policy, where reforms reduce both unemployment and the 
inflation bias. In contrast, a rule-based monetary policy inside EMU limits the benefits 
of reforms to a positive impact on employment. Expressed more generally, the degree 
of reforms is therefore higher in the case of autonomous policy (discretion) and lower 
in the case of commitment. We address this hypothesis the Calmfors hypothesis 
throughout this chapter (Calmfors, 1997, 1998; Gruener and Hefeker, 1996).  
Hence, our central question relates to the correlation between reform intensity 
and the degree of autonomy of monetary policy, which might be determined to a large 
degree by the exchange rate regime, at least if the country is small and open (Duval 
and Elmeskov, 2005: 9 and 23 ff.). We focus on the notion of monetary policy 
autonomy instead of discretion since we consider autonomy as an important 
prerequisite of discretionary monetary policy. In this respect, our approach strictly 
follows Duval and Elmeskov (2005: 25) who measure the loss of autonomy of 
monetary policy by the degree of participation in any kind of fixed exchange rate 
agreement. 
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2.2 Extension to the open economy case 
As an extension of our theoretical considerations in section 2, we include open-
ness of the economy in particular as we ask how the exchange rate regime affects re-
form intensity.19 Economic openness generally relates to the share of exports and im-
ports in GDP. A stronger exposure of firms to international competition is often as-
sumed to increase the pressure and the incentives for market-oriented reforms. In 
open economies, output and employment tend to be highly responsive to price com-
petitiveness and, hence, incentives to undertake reforms are large (see, e.g., Katzen-
stein, 1985, and Nickell, 2005: 2-3).  
However, empirical evidence is not especially supportive of the view that open 
economies are more likely to liberalize. Although Pitlik and Wirth (2003) report a 
positive impact of economic openness on market-oriented reforms, Herz and Vogel 
(2005) and Pitlik (2004) do not find robust significant coefficients of economic open-
ness for their summary reform indicator. Only for trade policy there is a positive ef-
fect of economic openness on liberalization.  
Section 2.1 indicates a possible solution to this finding. The key insight is that 
more open economies are more likely to implement rule-based exchange rate stabiliza-
tion and, hence, generally implement less reform. Table 1 illustrates this empirical rela-
tion between economic openness and exchange rate policy. Exchange rate flexibility is 
measured on a scale from 1 (hard peg) to 4 (free float). The average and median statis-
tics indicate that less open economies tend to have relatively flexible exchange rate re-
gimes, whereas very open economies tend to favor currency pegs. 
 
Table 1. – Economic openness and exchange rate regimes 1970-2000 
Degree of openness 
(Trade/GDP) 
Average Median Observations 
< 0.25 2.65 2.93 60 
0.25 – 0.75 2.27 2 471 
0.75 – 1.25 1.98 2 200 
> 1.25 1.51 1 59 
Sources: The data on the exchange rate flexibility are taken from Reinhart und Rogoff (2002). We measure eco-
nomic openness as the sum of exports plus imports relative to GDP. The data are extracted from the World 
Development Indicators Database (World Bank 2002). 
 
As we use the term monetary policy rule in a general fashion, i.e. that it comprises 
both monetary and exchange rate policy, we equate flexible exchange rates with the 
case of autonomous and discretionary monetary policy and use the notion of a fixed 
exchange rate system in cases which we originally addressed as rule-based monetary 
policy. But is this generalization legitimate, i.e. to interpret our model also in terms of 
exchange rate regimes instead of monetary policy regimes?  
                                                 
19 Belke, Herz and Vogel deal with another extension of our simple model considerations concerning 
the Calmfors model. It relates to our approach to not only take into account labor market reforms 
but also to include liberalizations in other policy fields.  
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As a stylized fact, the amount of money in an open economy is not determined 
autonomously by the central bank but is determined endogenously by the exchange 
rate regime (see, e.g., Annett, 1993: 25; Krugman and Obstfeld, 2003, chapters 16 and 
17). From early political business cycle research it is well-known that especially in the 
case of small open economies there is little evidence of rational partisan cycles in the 
sense of high and increasing inflation under left-wing governments and low and di-
minishing inflation rates under right-wing regimes.20 The standard literature generally 
traces the absence of partisan cycles back to the fact that small open economies tend 
to have fixed exchange rates which limits the ability to exert an ideologically motivated 
impact on inflation.21  
Empirical studies of the rational partisan theory clearly show that left-wing gov-
ernments are more likely to experience inflation, capital flight, current account deficits 
and currency devaluation.22 Hence, we feel justified to equate a flexible exchange rate 
system with a regime of autonomous and discretionary monetary policy and a system 
of fixed exchange rates with a rule-based monetary policy regime. From this point of 
view, our previous arguments that have been elaborated for the concepts ‘rule-based 
versus discretionary monetary policy’ can be transferred to ‘fixed versus flexible ex-
change rate systems’ and be tested empirically in a straightforward fashion. 
 
2.3 Empirical analysis and policy conclusions 
HYPOTHESES 
The following section investigates the existence of a significant empirical correla-
tion between monetary commitment and market liberalization conditional on the addi-
tional impact factors, such as the macroeconomic environment and political or institu-
tional restrictions to economic reform. Hence, we test for a significant coefficient of 
monetary commitment in regressions using reform indices as the dependent variable. 
From the preceding sections, we can derive the following hypotheses: 
(1) If the view of an excessive intensity of reforms under monetary policy autonomy 
holds, labor market reforms will be stronger under higher monetary discretion, 
net of other factors. 
(2) If the TINA-view of monetary commitment as a hard constraint is valid, one 
should expect the contrary, however. In this case monetary discretion negatively 
affects the degree of labor market reforms, net of other factors. According to the 
preceding sections, this should be valid not only for labor market reforms but 
also for complementary reforms in the goods and the financial markets and, 
hence, in this sense also for a broader reform index. As stated above, the latter 
                                                 
20 See Alesina (1992: 13-14), Alesina and Roubini (1992: 680) and Annett (1993: 25 and 42). 
21 See Alogoskoufis, Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1992: 1384) and Ellis and Thoma (1990: 17 and 
24). 
22 See Simmons (1994: 59), Ellis and Thoma (1990) estimate rational partisan theory approaches for 
open economies. In their study, party-specific inflation rates lead to party specific differences in ex-
change rate movements. 
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comprises the major areas: i) money and banking system, ii) government size, iii) 
freedom to trade, iv) market regulation and v) labor-market regulation. 
(3) If third factors dominate the relationship, monetary commitment should have lit-
tle effect on reforms, monetary commitment should have little effect on reforms.  
 
DATA AND DEFINITIONS 
We estimate and test the conjectured impact of monetary commitment on the de-
gree of market-oriented reforms based on a panel of 23 OECD economies for the pe-
riod 1970 to 2000.23 Restricting our empirical analysis to this group of countries en-
sures a relatively homogeneous institutional setup. As dependent variable we use the 
extent of economic liberalization as measured by the Economic Freedom of the World 
(EFW) index and the sub-indices money and banking system, freedom to trade, government size 
and labor market, credit and business regulation, respectively (Gwartney and Lawson 2003, 
Gwartney et al. 2003).  
The empirical realizations of these indices range from one to ten, with a high 
value corresponding to a high level of economic freedom. The EFW index and the 
sub-indices are available in five-year intervals over the period 1970-2000.24 An increase 
in the index value indicates a market-oriented reform. Hence, we use wider reform in-
dicators and a wider time span than Duval and Elmeskov (2005), who investigate data 
from five policy areas: unemployment benefit systems, labor taxes, employment pro-
tection legislation, product market regulation and retirement schemes.  
Among the explaining variables, our discussion focuses on the measure of mone-
tary commitment (MC). Monetary commitment is approximated by the Freytag (2005) 
indicator. The MC indicator is a composed index, restricted to values between 0 and 1. 
Higher values indicate a stronger monetary commitment. MC consists of ten criteria 
such as the central bank’s personal and political independence, the importance of price 
stability as an objective, and lending restrictions for the central bank (Freytag 2001, 
pp. 186-193). The index is calculated as the non-weighted average of these criteria and 
comparable to Cukierman’s (1992, p. 381) indicator of central bank independence. In 
contrast to the latter, however, the variable MC includes information about external 
relations like the submission to an exchange-rate target, which appears quite appropri-
ate in our open economy context (Freytag 2001).   
There are two theoretical reasons for these extensions: first, with a political deci-
sion about the exchange rate regime, especially in the case of a currency peg, govern-
ments are able to counter the central bank’s monetary policy – thereby seriously ques-
                                                 
23 The 23 OECD economies correspond to the category high-income industrialized countries in the 
World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2002) and cover Australia, Canada, the former 
EU-15, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the United States. 
24 We use the chain-weighted EFW index (Gwartney et al., 2003), which corrects for the limited avail-
ability of some components over time. Such chain-linked correction is only available for the summary 
indicator, however. For the sub-areas money and banking system, government size, freedom to trade, 
market regulation and labor-market regulation, we have to rely on uncorrected data instead. Missing 
data for indicator elements may distort the value of the sectoral indicators and distort the accuracy of 
these measures of economic reform.  
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tioning central bank independence. Second, if monetary reforms are backed by an ex-
change rate peg as a nominal anchor; external aspects become constitutive elements of 
the new monetary commitment. The indicator is available for a set of high income 
countries only, which basically coincides with the 23 high-income OECD economies 
and also motivates our restriction to this country sample. The data are available at de-
cennial frequency only.  
As an alternative proxy to account for monetary commitment we use exchange 
rate flexibility (EXR) in our robustness checks. While the MC indicator includes legal 
aspects of the exchange rate regime and their impact on monetary commitment, it 
does not account for the de facto implementation of the exchange rate regime. As the 
de jure and de facto exchange rate regime of a country may considerably differ, we 
employ the Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) index of de facto exchange rate arrangements.25 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) distinguish between exchange rate pegs (1), limited flexi-
bility (2), managed floating (3), and freely floating (4).26 Thus, the index value increases 
in the de facto exchange rate flexibility. For our purpose and due to the time structure 
of the EFW data, we average the Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) index values over ten-
year intervals. Note that the monetary commitment indicator MC and our measure of 
exchange rate flexibility both measure monetary policy autonomy, but on an inverse 
scale.  
The additional control variables that we consider include inflation, economic 
growth, real per capita GDP and openness as proxies of the pressure to reform. Data 
are available from the World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2002). 
Economic openness is defined as exports plus imports relative to GDP. To account 
for the potential endogeneity and in accordance with other contributions (e.g., Herz 
and Vogel, 2005; Lora 2000; Pitlik 2004; Pitlik and Wirth, 2003), we use these variables 
in first lags.  
A final set of controls accounts for political and institutional barriers to policy re-
forms. Here we include POLCON5 and the number of government changes. POL-
CON5 (Henisz, 2000, 2002) measures the effective political restrictions on executive 
behavior. It accounts for the veto powers of the executive, two legislative chambers, 
the sub-national entities and an independent judiciary. The index ranges from zero to 
one, where a higher value indicates stronger political constraints on the government. 
Given the time structure of our dependent variable, we take average values of POL-
CON5 for the respective decade. If political constraints and economic reforms were 
                                                 
25 The de facto measure improves on the de jure classification of IMF (2003) since it takes into ac-
count that de jure exchange rate regimes are not necessarily applied in practice. This has especially 
been the case in developing countries but also in industrialized countries. Austria, e.g., had a de facto 
fixed exchange rate regime vis-à-vis Germany for a long time without being a formal member of the 
exchange rate mechanism of the EMS. See Hochreiter and Tavlas (2005). 
26 Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) include freely falling rates as an additional category. We add the cases 
of freely falling rates to the free-float category, however. 
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negatively correlated, we should obtain a significant negative coefficient on POL-
CON5.27  
GOVCHANGES counts the number of government changes in each period that 
entail a significant programmatic reorientation. The data are taken from Beck et al. 
(2001). One could argue that frequent changes shorten the administration’s time hori-
zon and cause a stronger discounting of positive future payoffs. If frequent govern-
ment changes decreased the credibility and reliability of economic policy and the gov-
ernment’s decisiveness to reform, we should expect a significant negative coefficient 
for GOVCHANGES.  
 
2.3.3 Empirical model and results 
EMPIRICAL MODEL 
To empirically analyze the role of monetary commitment, economic crisis, and 
political as well as institutional features for economic reform we estimate the equation  
0 1 , 1 2 3 , 1 4' 'it i t it i t it i t itEFW EFW MC X Yα α α α α η λ ε− −∆ = + + + + + + + ,  
where ∆EFW represents our index of reforms, i.e. the change in economic freedom, 
or the respective sub-indices. MC is our measure of monetary commitment, X is the 
vector of macroeconomic variables (growth, inflation, openness, per-capita GDP), Y 
captures the political and institutional impact on the capacity to reform, and i is a 
country index. Most importantly and in accordance with the Calmfors perspective on 
labor market reform, we expect 02 <α  for MC, and 02 >α  under the EXR indicator, 
if monetary commitment and structural reforms were substitutes. The TINA-view 
should give the contrary, namely the inequalities 02 >α  for MC and 02 <α  for EXR.  
We add time-specific effects ( 2λ ) to account for unobserved heterogeneity across 
time. The short time dimension of our sample complicates the use of country fixed ef-
fects. As there are three observations available per country at best, any estimate of in-
dividual effects would be very imprecise, and the insertion of country dummies would 
significantly reduce the degrees of freedom in the estimation. For this reason we do 
not include country dummies in our regression.  
The empirical model includes the lagged dependent variable among the regres-
sors, which biases OLS estimates. In a first step we apply the GLS estimator that al-
lows estimation in the presence of both heteroskedasticity and first-order residual 
autocorrelation (Baltagi, 1995; Hsiao, 2003). Secondly, we present GMM system esti-
mates (Arellano and Bover 1995, Blundell and Bond 1998). We report the one-step es-
                                                 
27 Note that the political constraints may restrict changes in either direction, however. They may limit 
both liberalization and the restriction of economic freedom. Further evidence may be derived from 
an interaction between political constraints and the government’s programmatic orientation. This ex-
tension is beyond the focus of this chapter, however. Herz and Vogel (2005) and Pitlik (2004) pro-
vide an in-depth discussion of the impact of political constraints.  
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timates with robust standard error, which are to be preferred with potentially het-
eroskedastic error terms (Arellano and Bond 1991).28 
 
EMPIRICAL MODEL 
This section presents the regression results for our sample of OECD economies. 
We report the regression results for overall liberalization, money and banking system, govern-
ment size, freedom to trade, market regulation and the sub-index labor-market regulation as de-
pendent variables. Table 2 displays the GLS panel estimates. 
 
- Table 2 and 3 about here - 
 
With the exception of overall market regulation, the initial level of economic free-
dom has a significant negative impact on the extent of subsequent market-oriented re-
forms in the GLS estimates. Higher initial levels of economic freedom reduce the 
scope and the need for further liberalization. They indicate lower problem pressure. 
The negative coefficient values also indicate a conditional convergence in economic 
policy (Duval and Elmeskov, 2005: 23 ff.). The finding, however, weakens if we turn 
to the GMM estimates in Table 3.  
The chapter’s main focus is on the correlation of monetary commitment with 
market-oriented reforms. The GLS results indicate a negative correlation between 
monetary commitment and money and banking sector reform and a positive correlation 
between monetary commitment and labor-market reform. GMM estimation obtains a 
significantly positive commitment coefficient for labor-market and overall regulatory 
reform. Monetary commitment seems to be uncorrelated with trade policy, govern-
ment size and the overall measure of economic freedom.  
The negative GLS coefficient estimate for the impact of monetary commitment 
on money and banking sector reform may parallel the negative impact of the lagged 
dependent variable. Monetary commitment and sound money may be close proxies, in 
fact. Consequently, a high level of commitment may indicate little need for monetary 
reform and thus may explain the negative impact. More interesting in the light of the 
Calmfors hypothesis is the positive estimated relation between monetary commitment 
and both overall regulatory and labor-market reform. Although the Calmfors hypothe-
sis essentially targets labor-market reforms, the estimate does not support its basic 
conclusion. We find no evidence for a negative impact of commitment on labor-
market reform. Instead, both policies seem to be complements. This result supports 
the TINA-view of monetary commitment as a hard constraint.  
Most of the control variables are insignificant in most cases. If anything, political 
constraints (POLCON) have a positive rather than a negative impact on economic re-
form. We find significant positive coefficients of POLCON for government size and 
trade liberalization. The results are compatible with the estimates of Pitlik (2004) for a 
                                                 
28 The Sargan test for instrument validity is taken from the two-step estimates, however, because the 
one-step statistics tends to over-reject the test in the presence of heteroskedasticity (Arellano and 
Bond 1991). 
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larger and more diverse country sample and in line with his interpretation of political 
constraints as a commitment device. They may furthermore reflect the fact that con-
straints also tend to reduce the reversibility of reforms. The coefficient estimates for 
the number of government changes, which could be interpreted as an indicator for 
credibility and political commitment, are largely insignificant – a result which contrasts 
Herz and Vogel (2005) and Pitlik (2004) for larger country samples and shorter time 
intervals.   
The macroeconomic control variables play a limited role in our regressions. High 
inflation which could indicate a greater need for reform has a robust and positive im-
pact on overall economic liberalization and the fiscal sector and is also significantly 
positive in the GMM estimates for market regulation. The result is qualitatively in line 
with Drazen and Easterly (2001) and Pitlik and Wirth (2003). However, one should 
bear in mind that both studies consider more severe crises in their broader country 
sample. Our results indicate that in OECD countries smaller increases in inflation suf-
fice to trigger structural reforms than in low and middle income countries.29 Higher 
growth as an indicator of either the ability to reform or the lack of pressure has a posi-
tive impact on money and banking system reform and a negative one on government 
size. The latter result coincides with the critical view that governments tend to react to 
fiscal pressure, but do not use good times for public sector consolidation.  
The estimates for economic openness are generally insignificant. The same holds 
for per-capita GDP, except in the GLS estimate for monetary and banking reform. 
The insignificance of economic openness does not support the hypothesis that the ex-
posure to world markets increases the pressure for liberalization and that it leads to 
stronger market-oriented reforms. The time dummies are significant in most cases and 
indicate that, on average, monetary sector reform was especially pronounced during 
the 1980s and that overall, government size, trade-policy and regulatory reform were 
particularly prevalent during the 1990s. 
Taken together, the estimates do not support the hypothesis that monetary discre-
tion promotes structural reforms and that monetary commitment and reforms are sub-
stitutes, net of other factors. In contrast, there is evidence for the TINA hypothesis in 
the area of market and especially labor-market regulation. Monetary commitment and 
structural reforms may be complements rather than substitutes in the field of regula-
tory reform.  
 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
To check our results with respect to the key hypothesis, we apply an alternative 
indicator for monetary commitment, namely exchange rate flexibility. In an open econ-
omy, flexible exchange rates closely correspond with monetary autonomy and the fea-
sibility of monetary discretion, whereas an exchange rate peg indicates the adoption of 
a monetary rule. Monetary commitment does not necessarily imply a fixed exchange 
rate, however. Instead, a central bank may pursue inflation or monetary targeting. As 
                                                 
29 The effect is limited however. Given the estimates in Table 3, a one percentage-point inflation in-
crease leads to 0.06 additional points on the reform index during the subsequent decade. 
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discussed above, our exchange rate indicator accounts for the realization of the de 
facto exchange rate regime and might therefore provide additional information to the 
MC indicator, which focuses on de jure aspects of monetary commitment. Hence, we 
check the robustness of our results by using exchange rate flexibility to account for 
another important aspect of monetary autonomy.  
Belke, Herz and Vogel (2006) contains the detailed results of this check. We focus 
on the estimates for exchange-rate commitment. The control estimates are to a large 
degree qualitatively similar to the results in Table 3. We find a negative impact of ex-
change-rate flexibility on monetary and banking sector reform and on trade liberaliza-
tion and a positive estimate for government size. The positive correlation between ex-
change rate commitment and trade liberalization coincides with the view of the ex-
change rate peg as an instrument to facilitate international exchanges and to fully reap 
the benefits of economic integration. Indeed, the complementarity between trade and 
exchange rate commitment was a prominent argument in favor of EMU (Emerson et 
al. 1992).  
The negative correlation between exchange rate flexibility and money and banking 
sector reform directly points to the commitment effect of an external anchor. Pegging 
the exchange rate increases the credibility of the monetary authority and allows im-
porting stability. Lower inflation expectations and inflation rates translate into a posi-
tive indicator change. A credible exchange rate commitment might also have reduced 
exchange rate risks leading to deeper domestic financial markets, increased competi-
tion and improved financing conditions. The positive correlation between exchange 
rate flexibility and government sector reform could finally result from governments 
being less reform-minded under flexible rates and an independent monetary policy, or 
from the lower costs of structural reforms under monetary accommodation that is not 
possible in monetary union. From the Calmfors perspective, it is important to note 
that the exchange rate indicator is not significant for overall regulation or labor-market 
reform.  
Again, there is no support for a complementarity between monetary discretion 
and structural reform. Neither does the insignificance of the exchange rate indicator 
support the TINA perspective from Table 3. The exchange rate measure only captures 
part of the monetary commitment, and potentially not its decisive elements and its 
impact on structural reforms in our sample of OECD economies.  
Both the sub-indicator for money and banking sector reform and, consequently, also 
the aggregate index of economic freedom contain information about lagged inflation 
rates. Therefore, the inclusion of lagged inflation as an explanatory variable is poten-
tially problematic. In order to check the robustness of the estimates, we have rerun the 
regressions in Tables 2 and 3 (and also Table 4 in Belke, Herz and Vogel, 2006) for 
overall and monetary and banking reform and excluded lagged inflation as a regressor. 
However, this modification has no qualitative impact on the estimates for monetary 
and exchange rate commitment. The lagged dependent variable becomes insignificant 
for monetary reform in Table 2, and the lagged levels of overall economic freedom 
and sound money are significantly negative in Table 3 and Table 4 in Belke, Herz and 
Vogel (2006). Political constraints are now significantly positive for overall economic 
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freedom, and higher per-capita income seems to improve the prospect for reform. 
None of these changes does affect our conclusions on the complementarity or substi-
tutability of monetary commitment and economic reforms and on the Calmfors hy-
pothesis in particular, however.  
This chapter has investigated the link between monetary policy of open econo-
mies and structural reforms. We have confronted our data set with three hypotheses: i) 
the (extended) Calmfors hypothesis, according to which the degree of reforms is 
higher in the case of autonomous policy and lower in the case of commitment, ii) the 
TINA hypothesis which implies a positive impact of a monetary policy rule on the ex-
tent of reforms, and iii) a third factors hypothesis: if third factors dominate the rela-
tionship, monetary commitment should turn out insignificant. Empirical estimations 
were performed with panel data on 23 OECD countries from 1970-2000. The struc-
tural reforms are measured by the Economic Freedom of the World index, whereas 
the monetary policy constraint was measured by a monetary commitment index and 
the exchange rate regime. Our results provide little evidence to the hypothesis that 
monetary autonomy promotes structural reforms and economic freedom. Instead, our 
estimates for regulatory and labor-market reform are strongly in favor of the TINA 
argument. Neither overall monetary nor exchange rate commitment affects the overall 
index of structural reforms, however. Exchange rate commitment and money and bank-
ing sector reform and exchange rate commitment and trade liberalization both appear to 
be complements.  
Seen on the whole, we would like to stress that the ECB should not give in and 
enact a discretionary policy with an eye on dismal labor market performance. This 
would best serve to foster and to support structural reform efforts - not at least by the 
German Grand Coalition - in the euro area. The results also strongly argue against 
those maintaining that a discretionary and lax monetary policy stance has never and 
nowhere been detrimental for employment. Our empirical results reveal that discre-
tionary monetary policy tends to lead to a lower degree of structural reforms and, 
hence, to lower employment.  
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Table 2. Reforms and monetary commitment - GLS estimates with commitment indicator 
 EFW Money
Govern-
ment size Trade Regulation 
Labor 
market
Monetary commitment  -0.24 
(-0.77) 
-0.90* 
(-1.79)
-0.04 
(-0.05)
-0.40 
(-0.62)
0.53 
(1.48) 
2.17** 
(2.41)
EFW, M, G, T, R, LM (t-1) -0.17* 
(-1.67) 
-0.48*** 
(-5.54)
-0.36*** 
(-3.98)
-0.56*** 
(-5.19)
-0.03 
(-0.34) 
-0.23** 
(-2.24)
Inflation (t-1) 2.41*** 
(2.79) 
-3.20 
(-1.65)
4.60** 
(2.37)
-3.29* 
(-1.80)
1.70** 
(2.23) 
-0.30 
(-0.08)
Growth (t-1) 0.32 
(0.12) 
11.0** 
(2.17)
-9.09 
(-1.33)
-6.78 
(-1.18)
-3.00 
(-0.94) 
-0.47 
(-0.06)
Openness (t-1) -0.16 
(-1.02) 
0.28 
(1.25)
-0.65 
(-1.18)
0.32 
(0.89)
-0.08 
(-0.43) 
-0.65 
(-0.97)
LnRGDPpc (t-1) 0.28 
(1.12) 
1.79*** 
(4.37)
-0.07 
(-0.10)
-0.48 
(-0.92)
-0.13 
(-0.44) 
-0.18 
(-0.18)
POLCON5 0.04 
(0.06) 
-1.42 
(-1.42)
2.99* 
(1.80)
2.19 
(1.46)
0.77 
(1.03) 
1.00 
(0.53)
GOVCHANGES -0.02 
(-0.29) 
-0.04 
(-0.32)
-0.06 
(-0.39)
-0.12 
(-0.93)
0.02 
(0.24) 
0.09 
(0.54)
Constant -1.88 
(-0.90) 
-12.5*** 
(-3.69)
-0.33 
(-0.05)
7.46 
(1.63)
0.82 
(0.33) 
1.60 
(1.17)
D1980s 0.63*** 1.35*** 0.91*** 0.48 -0.24 -0.10
D1990s 1.04*** 1.03*** 1.16*** 0.95** 0.91*** -0.67
AR (1) (p-value) 0.96 0.43 0.81 0.42 0.10* 0.79
R2 0.77 0.72 0.77 0.45 0.73 0.32
Observations 58 58 58 58 57 51
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Table 3. Reforms and monetary commitment – 1-step GMM system estimates with commitment indi-
cator 
 EFW Money
Govern-
ment size Trade Regulation 
Labor 
market
Monetary commitment  -0.38 
(-0.73)
0.39 
(0.25)
0.12 
(0.13)
0.01 
(0.02)
0.77** 
(2.29) 
1.59** 
(2.20)
EFW, M, G, T, R, LM (t-1) 0.34 
(0.72)
0.21 
(0.26)
-0.18 
(-0.94)
-0.57*** 
(-4.02)
-0.23 
(-1.54) 
-0.43** 
(-2.38)
Inflation (t-1) 6.00*** 
(3.17)
16.6 
(1.31)
4.62*** 
(3.56)
-1.80* 
(-1.74)
1.20 
(1.44) 
-1.17 
(-0.35)
Growth (t-1) 5.15 
(1.23)
23.4** 
(2.28)
-13.7* 
(-1.77)
-3.85 
(-0.70)
-2.30 
(-0.82) 
0.10 
(0.01)
Openness (t-1) -0.20 
(-1.02)
-0.12 
(-0.21)
-0.61 
(-1.09)
0.17 
(0.52)
-0.13 
(-0.51) 
-1.33 
(-1.30)
LnRGDPpc (t-1) -0.04 
(-0.09)
0.53 
(0.25)
0.13 
(0.20)
-0.38 
(-0.96)
0.02 
(0.06) 
0.37 
(0.51)
POLCON5 -1.04 
(-0.73)
0.44 
(0.18)
2.93*** 
(2.85)
2.76** 
(2.55)
0.68 
(1.10) 
1.89 
(1.13)
GOVCHANGES 0.08 
(0.86)
0.41* 
(1.73)
-0.05 
(-0.25)
-0.03 
(-0.25)
0.06 
(0.87) 
-0.02 
(-0.19)
Constant -1.97 
(-0.83)
-9.67 
(-0.72)
-3.20 
(-0.46)
5.72 
(1.61)
0.46 
(0.13) 
-1.64 
(-0.42)
D1980s 0.68* 0.89** 1.06*** 0.40 -0.18 -0.07
D1990s 1.09*** 0.83 1.14** 0.80** 0.89*** -0.67
AR (1) (p-value) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.05** 0.07* 0.02** 0.49
Sargan test (p-value) 0.90 0.15 0.35 0.24 0.30 0.09*
Observations 58 58 58 58 57 51
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PART 3 
A critical review of the real interest rate 
concept   
 
CONTENT: 3.1 Calculating the neutral real interest rate. – 3.2 Monetary policy transmission and the 
interest rate. – 3.3 Consequences for monetary policy. 
 
SUMMARY: The concept of the neutral (real) interest rate (NRIR) – as implied by the Taylor rule – rec-
ommends monetary policy to set the real interest rate at a level which closes, or at least smoothes, the output 
gap. We argue that such a policy, if put into practice, would entail substantial pitfalls. First, monetary policy 
is hardly in a position to influence real GDP; a systematic impact of monetary policy on long-term interest 
rates and GDP is hardly detectable. To make things worse, a cyclically oriented policy might provoke the 
well-known time-lag problem. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the NRIR concept may not be com-
patible with price stability, as it ignores the impact of credit and money growth on inflation. – As a result, we 
favour a long-term oriented monetary policy that has a strong focus on credit and money growth and asset 
prices. Such a monetary policy would not only be compatible with the objective of price stability. It would also 
reduce the risk of the economy falling into (a monetary induced) financial crisis which, in turn, could have a 
highly negative impact on output and employment. 
 
 
3.1 Calculating the neutral real interest rate  
OVERVIEW 
The neutral real interest rate (NRIR) is defined as the level of the real interest rate that 
is consistent with low and stable inflation and real production corresponding to poten-
tial production. To put it differently: the NRIR is the rate consistent with the output 
gap (y – y*) and inflation gap (π – π*) being zero, where y (y*) represents (potential) 
output and π (π*) is actual (target) inflation.  
The concept of the NRIR stems from the work of the Swedish economist Knut 
Wicksell30: “There is a certain rate of interest on loans which is neutral in respect to commodity 
prices, and tend neither to raise nor to lower them. This is necessarily the same as the rate of interest 
which would be determined by supply and demand if no use were made of money and all lending were 
effected in the form of real capital goods.” 
If, according to the so-called Wicksell process, the market interest rate falls below 
the neutral interest rate (i < in), investment will exceed saving (I > S), implying that ag-
gregate demand will be greater than aggregate supply (AD > AS). This, in turn, is 
supposed to fuel demand for bank loans and push up the general level of prices. Al-
ternatively, if the market rate rises above the neutral rate (i > in), savings will exceed 
investment (I < S), aggregate supply will exceed aggregate demand (AD < AS), bank 
loans and the stock of money will contract, translating into a decline of the price level. 
                                                 
30 Knut Wicksell (2002, p. 102). 
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That said, whenever the market interest rate equals the neutral level, the economy is 
said to be in equilibrium.  
Economic theory has it that the (long-term) real interest rate corresponds, in 
equilibrium, to the economy’s potential output growth. In fact, in equilibrium an 
economy’s potential growth matches the marginal return on capital (adjusted for risk). 
According to the Golden Rule, the risk-adjusted marginal return on capital should, in 
equilibrium, equal the long-term real interest rate.31 
Let us assume monetary policy would follow the NRIR concept. Here, the cen-
tral bank reaction function might be formulated as follows:  
 (1) )ii(r nt −λ=∆ , 
where λ < 0 shows the intensity with which the official interest rate, r, is changed in 
response to the interest rate gap, that is the difference between the actual real money 
market rate (it) and the NRIR (in). As the NRIR is unobservable and unknown, 
economists have put forward a variety of estimation/calculating methods.32  
 
3-months interest rate, nominal and real (%)
(a) US (b) Euro area
Source: ECB, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Thomson Financials; own calculations. - Real yields were
calculated by substracting annual consumer price inflation from nominal yields. - Monthly data for the US,
quarterly data for the euro area.
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ESTIMATING THE NRIR 
A rather simple approach is to assume that the NRIR corresponds to the real in-
terest rate trend as observed in the past. A popular method is smoothing the ex post real 
interest rate series by using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. Such an approach might 
be a reasonable approximation for periods in which output and inflation gaps were 
zero. In periods of (large) output and inflation swings, however, such an estimation 
method might be associated with substantial errors. 
A more sophisticated approach is combining econometric tools and structural 
macroeconomic modeling techniques. For instance, Laubach and Williams (2003) 
make use of a structural model, which consists of three equations. The authors use an 
                                                 
31 See Bernhardsen (2005); Björksten and Karagedikli (2003). 
32 See Wu (2005). 
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IS-function that (i) relates the output gap to the NRIR, (ii) includes a Phillips curve (relat-
ing inflation to the output gap) and (iii) specifies the positive correlations between the 
NRIR and the trend growth of output. 
Once the macroeconomic model is specified, the researcher can estimate the 
NRIR through exploring the correlations between the interest rate, inflation, and out-
put. If actual output exceeds trend (as predicted by the model), part of the unexpected 
strength in output will be attributable to a more accommodative monetary policy, 
which, in turn, implies that the NRIR was higher than projected.  
Based on the paper of Laubach and Williams, the Kalman-Filter method has be-
come a rather popular methodology for calculating the NRIR. Applying the Kalman-
Filter to a small-scale macroeconomic model, one can de-trend the data to estimate 
unobservable variables such as the NRIR and potential output simultaneously. 
NRIR are also estimated by using so-called stochastic dynamic general equilib-
rium models (SDGEM). These models define the NRIR as the interest rate that would 
prevail if all prices and wages were flexible. The concept allows for a time-varying 
NRIR, depending on structural factors. To estimate the NRIR, the parameters of the 
model must either be estimated or calibrated. While theoretically appealing, in practice 
the estimates turn out to be rather sensitive to choices regarding model specifications 
and parameter values.33  
 
NRIR AND THE TAYLOR RULE 
At this juncture it is of interest to highlight the relation between the NRIR and 
the well-known Taylor rule (Taylor 1993). The Taylor rule can be written as: 
(2) i  = i* + π* + α (π – π*) + β (y – y*) with α, β > 0.  
This is equivalent to: 
(3a) i – π + π – π* – i* = α (π – π*) + β (y – y*), and 
(3b) (ir – i*) + (π – π*) = α (π – π*) + β (y – y*). 
So the neutral rate i* is: 
(4) i* = ir  + (1 – α) (π – π*) – β (y – y*). 
So, if α and β are known, the NRIR can be easily calculated. However, to esti-
mate α and β, i* must be known; in fact, it has to be calculated first.  
 
PROBLEMS WITH ESTIMATING THE NRIR 
Independent of the method used for calculating the NRIR, a number of prob-
lems arise (Wu, 2005): 
(1) The first difficulty has to do with the so-called one-sided filtering problem. Statistical 
theory tells us that, in estimating unobservable variables, the more observations 
are used in the estimation, the more accurate is the estimates. In reality, how-
ever, we can observe macroeconomic data only up to today. Therefore, the esti-
mate of today’s NRIR based on data which is available today will be quite differ-
                                                 
33 Details on the issue can be found in Gali (2002) and Giammarioli and Valla (2004). 
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ent from the estimate when we have data beyond today – which are called two-
sided or smoothed estimates. 
(2) In addition, estimating the NRIR tends to suffer from the fact that macroeco-
nomic data (especially GDP) are often revised. In many cases such revisions can 
be quite substantial. This, of course, might weaken the reliability of NRIR esti-
mates.   
(3) Our discussion so far has assumed that the macroeconomic model underlying 
the estimates of the NRIR is correct. However, there might be alternative mod-
els of the economy, and usually there is no consensus about which model is ac-
tually the correct one/most reliable. 
 
NRIR AND MONETARY POLICY  
The monetary policy recommendation that follows from the NRIR concept is 
that whenever there is a positive output gap, monetary policy-makers should set the 
interest rate at a level which puts downward pressure on demand, thereby dampening 
inflationary pressure. Alternatively, whenever actual output is lower than potential, the 
central bank should set the real interest rate at a level which stimulates spending, in-
ducing investment and consumption, thereby increasing demand and avoiding the 
emergence of downward price pressure. 
However, is it really advisable for a central bank, which aims at maintaining price 
stability like the ECB, to base its policy decision on the output gap as required by the 
NRIR concept? As can be argued, a number of serious difficulties would arise which 
run counter the objective of keeping inflation at a low and stable level.   
To start with, monetary policy works with long (and often uncertain) time-lags. 
If the central bank lowers interest rates today (as a direct response to below-potential 
growth), the actual policy impact on output will be felt at a (much) later point in time. 
An output oriented monetary policy could therefore easily become pro-cyclical, lead-
ing to unwanted swings in output, employment and inflation.  
What is more, an output oriented monetary policy might actually undermine the 
central bank’s political independence.34 Take, for instance, the case in which there are 
disappointing output and employment gains as a direct result of unfavourable macro-
economic policies (such as, for instance, high taxation, tight regulation, protectionism, 
etc.). Under a NRIR concept, the central bank would actually be required to bail out 
the government’s policy by cheap money. This, in turn, might (with a time delay) re-
sult in inflation (and, in addition, reduce economic incentives for bringing about struc-
tural reform).35  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, empirical evidence suggests that there are 
variables which appear to be much more important for inflation than the output gap. 
Indisputably, the output gap as a demand pull factor may have an impact on consumer 
prices in the short-run. However, as experience in many countries suggests, it is credit 
and money expansion that determines inflation in the medium- to long-run. However, 
                                                 
34 In this context see ECB-Observer (2001) and (2002, p. 17). 
35 See in this context part 2 „Monetary policy and structural reforms“ in this report. 
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as the NRIR concept ignores credit and money growth altogether, it is questionable 
whether it is actually compatible with price stability (that is preventing deflation and 
inflation).  
 
3.2 Monetary policy transmission and the interest rate 
What role does the (real) interest rate play in the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism? To answer this question, it might be worthwhile to take a brief look at 
two basic (and actually interrelated) transmission cannels: the money channel and the 
credit channel.36 
According to the money channel, a reduction in base money supply would limit the 
banking system’s ability to create additional credit and money. However, if loan de-
mand remains strong, banks would offer their clients higher deposit rates – to make 
them move part of their funds from sight and time deposits (which are subject to 
minimum reserves) into bank liabilities which are not subject to reserve holdings. By 
doing so, minimum reserves are transformed into free reserves. As bonds are substi-
tutes for time and savings deposits, yields on coupon bearing financial instruments can 
be expected to rise. This makes investments in stocks and real investments less attrac-
tive. As a result, the reduction in base money would eventually, by affecting the yield 
environment, reduce output and inflation.  
The credit channel model holds that a restrictive monetary can be delivered by rais-
ing central bank rates. This, in turn, leads to an immediate rise in borrowing costs. 
This is because rising rates on central bank reserves force banks to raise their lending 
rates. This, in turn, reduces the demand for loans and/or results in credit rationing. As a 
result, fewer investments would be realised, with output gains and inflation expected 
to slow down. 
It is important to note here that both the money channel and the credit channel as-
sume that the central bank can control, at least in the medium- to long-run, the long-
term interest rate: Either by setting money supply or by changing official short-term 
interest rates, monetary policy is supposed to influence long-term borrowing rates 
which, in turn, affect investment, output, employment and inflation. 
Against this background it should be of particular interest to form a view about 
the impact the ECB main refinancing rate exerts on long-term borrowing rates. Such a 
relation might be tested by using a simple Granger causality test (see box below).  
In the period January 1999 to November 2006, we find that the null hypothesis – 
namely that changes in nominal ECB refinancing rates do not Granger-cause changes in 
nominal long-term rates – cannot be rejected in virtually all tests under review. For 
real (that is inflation adjusted) rates, the null cannot be rejected in all cases under re-
view. Variations of the lag-structure do not change the results; tests in a vector error 
correction framework do not change these findings either.  
 
 
                                                 
36 See Bernanke and Gertler (1995). 
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Does the short-rate affect the long-rate area? 
 
Figure 3.2.1. – ECB and money market rates and 10-year Bund yield (%) 
Source:  Thomson Financials.
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Figure 3.2.1 shows short-term (official) interest rates and the 10-year Bund yield 
for the period January 1999 to November 2006. As noted above, both the money and 
credit view assume a (strong) impact of central bank rates on long-term interest rates. 
However, is there empirical support for these theories in the euro area? 
One test of causality is whether the lags of one variable enter into the equation of 
another variable. The Granger (1969) approach to the question of whether X causes Y is 
to see how much of the current Y can be explained by past values of Y and then to see 
whether adding lagged values of X can improve the explanation. Y is said to be Granger-
caused by X if X helps in the prediction of Y, or equivalently if the coefficients on the 
lagged X's are statistically significant. Note that two-way causation is frequently the case; 
X Granger causes Y and Y Granger causes X.  
 
(a) Euro area nominal rates (b) Euro area real rates (%) 
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Source: Thomson Financials, own calculations. 
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It is important to note that the statement “X Granger causes Y” does not imply that 
Y is the effect or the result of X. Granger causality measures precedence and information 
content but does not by itself indicate causality in the more common use of the term.  
The Granger causality approach runs bi-variate regressions in the following form: 
ttntntntt XßXßYaYaaY ε++++++= −−−− 111110 ......  and 
ttntntntt YßYßXaXaaX ε++++++= −−−− 111110 ...... , 
for all possible pairs of (X,Y) series in the group. The reported F-statistics are the Wald 
statistics for the joint hypothesis: 
0...21 ==== nßß β  
for each equation. The null hypothesis is that X does not Granger-cause Y in the first re-
gression and that Y does not Granger-cause X in the second regression.  
Running Granger causality tests, we made use of weekly 10-year Bund yields and the 
1- and 3-months money market rate for the period January 1999 to November 2006. 
Running a VAR model on the basis of changes in nominal rates, the Schwarz criterion 
suggests a lag length of zero, the Akaike criterion of 2 weeks. However, we also tested for 
higher lag lengths (see Figure 3.2.2). 
 
Figure 3.2.2. – Results of the Granger causality tests, nominal rates 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.
Lag 1 Lag 1
  D(I1M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 410 0.713 0.399   D(I3M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 410 0.240 0.624
  D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I1M) 0.126 0.722   D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I3M) 0.249 0.618
Lag 2 Lag 2
  D(I1M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 409 0.862 0.423   D(I3M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 409 0.448 0.639
  D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I1M) 0.264 0.768   D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I3M) 0.192 0.825
Lag 4 Lag 4
  D(I1M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 407 1.209 0.306   D(I3M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 407 3.545 0.007
  D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I1M) 1.079 0.366   D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I3M) 1.179 0.319
Lag 6 Lag 6
  D(I1M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 405 1.354 0.232   D(I3M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 405 2.451 0.024
  D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I1M) 0.872 0.515   D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I3M) 1.368 0.226
Lag 8 Lag 8
  D(I1M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 403 1.209 0.292   D(I3M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 403 1.842 0.068
  D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I1M) 1.099 0.363   D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I3M) 1.792 0.077
Lag 10 Lag 10
  D(I1M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 401 1.209 0.284   D(I1M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 401 1.209 0.284
  D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I1M) 1.265 0.249   D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I1M) 1.265 0.249
Lag 15 Lag 15
  D(I1M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 396 1.279 0.212   D(I3M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 396 1.385 0.151
  D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I1M) 1.700 0.049   D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I3M) 2.008 0.014
Lag 20 Lag 20
  D(I1M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 391 1.320 0.163   D(I3M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 391 1.437 0.102
  D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I1M) 1.745 0.025   D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I3M) 1.923 0.010  
Source: Thomson Financials, own calculations. – D = difference. I1M = 1-months money market rate, 
I3M = 3-months money market rate, I10Y = 10-year Bund yield. – Period: January 1999 to Novem-
ber 2006. – Weekly data.  
 
For virtually all lags under review, the null hypothesis – namely that changes in 
short-term interest rates do not Granger-cause changes in long-term yields – cannot 
be rejected; only for a lag of 4 and 6 weeks, changes in the 3-month rate tend to lead 
changes in the long rate. However, at longer lags, there seems to be evidence that 
changes in long-term rates Granger-cause changes in short-term rates. This finding 
might suggest that long-term yields adjust (driven by expectations) well before official 
 Money matters for inflation in the euro area  
_____________________________________________________________________________________________  
43
interest rates are changed. Turning to real rates, the results of the Granger tests cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that short-term rates do not Granger-cause long rates (see 
Figure 3.2.3).   
 
Figure 3.2.3. – Results of the Granger causality tests, real rates 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.
Lag 1 Lag 1
  D(I1M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 92 0.662 0.418   D(I3M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 92 1.650 0.202
  D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I1M) 1.072 0.303   D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I3M) 0.313 0.577
Lag 2 Lag 2
  D(I1M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 409 0.862 0.423   D(I3M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 91 1.917 0.153
  D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I1M) 0.264 0.768   D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I3M) 0.276 0.760
Lag 4 Lag 4
  D(I1M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 89 2.396 0.057   D(I3M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 89 1.792 0.139
  D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I1M) 0.526 0.717   D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I3M) 0.271 0.896
Lag 6 Lag 6
  D(I1M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 87 2.164 0.056   D(I3M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 87 1.803 0.110
  D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I1M) 0.436 0.853   D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I3M) 0.296 0.937
Lag 8 Lag 8
  D(I1M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 85 1.648 0.128   D(I3M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 85 1.210 0.307
  D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I1M) 0.464 0.877   D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I3M) 0.363 0.937
Lag 10 Lag 10
  D(I1M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 83 1.570 0.137   D(I3M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 83 1.338 0.231
  D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I1M) 0.847 0.586   D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I3M) 0.738 0.687
Lag 15 Lag 15
  D(I1M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 78 1.235 0.281   D(I3M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 78 0.980 0.490
  D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I1M) 1.152 0.341   D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I3M) 0.933 0.536
Lag 20 Lag 20
  D(I1M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 73 1.505 0.147   D(I3M) does not Granger Cause D(I10Y) 73 1.066 0.425
  D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I1M) 1.321 0.235   D(I10Y) does not Granger Cause D(I3M) 0.875 0.616  
Source: Thomson Financials, own calculations. – D = first difference, I1M = 1-months money market 
rate, I3M = 3-months money market rate, I10Y = 10-year Bund yield. – Period: January 1999 to No-
vember 2006. – Real rates were calculated by substracting annual HICP inflation from nominal rates. 
– Monthly data.  
 
Against the backdrop of these findings, there should at least be some hesitation 
when it comes to accepting the notion that monetary policy would be in a position to 
systematically influence medium- to long-term borrowing rates – as is required under 
the NRIR concept. So what would be the lesson to be learned from the discussion 
above?  
 
3.3 Consequences for monetary policy 
According to the consensus view in economics, a monetary policy approach is fa-
voured which is (i) concerned about inflation as well as output fluctuations, (ii) for-
ward looking, and (iii) prevents serious economic downturns related to financial insta-
bilities (bursting of bubbles, banking crises, etc.).  
 
HEDGING AGAINST FINANCIAL CRISES 
In periods of favourable economic expansion, with relatively little uncertainty 
about the correct model of the economy, the NRIR concept might indeed appear to 
be an attractive policy approach. However, the assessment might change drastically if 
the potential consequences of ignoring credit and money expansion are taken into ac-
count. 
Money matters for inflation in the euro area 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________  
 
44
A great number of studies seem to support the hypothesis that growth rates of 
credit and money play an important role not only for consumer price inflation37 but 
also for the development of asset prices. In theory, the potential role of credit and 
money supply growth for asset price developments is actually straightforward.38  
In fact, asset price inflation is much more likely to appear if investors can leverage 
their positions, that is finance purchases of existing assets by (additionally created) 
credit. Furthermore, a strongly rising money stock might signal the build up of ample 
liquidity, waiting to be invested in potentially higher-yielding opportunities. As a re-
sult, ample liquidity qualifies, at least theoretically speaking, as a source for asset price 
inflation.  
In many cases, asset price inflation, which tended to be accompanied by eco-
nomic boom periods, ended in a sharp correction, or even a collapse, of asset prices, 
turning boom into bust. In fact, many of the boom-and-bust cycles seen in the past have 
been accompanied, or preceded, by overly expansionary monetary policies – as evi-
denced by strong growth rates in credit and money supply (see, for instance, Detken 
and Smets (2004)). 
 
Money and asset prices in Japan 
Figure 3.3.1. – Japanese income velocity, trend deviations and the stock market 
(a) Japanese income velocity of "broad money" (b) Deviation of income velocity from trend
Source:  Thomson Financia; own estimation. - Income velocity is defined as nominal GDP minus stock of broad money (all 
variables in logarithms). - Period: 1980-Q1 to 2005-Q4. 
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A visual inspection suggests that the strong rise in the Japanese Nikkei stock market 
index around the second half of the 1980s was accompanied by overly generous money 
supply growth relative to income gains (see Figure 3.3.1). This is illustrated by actual in-
come velocity falling below its long-run trend.  
What is more, the decline in stock prices, starting around the end of 1989, appears to 
have been accompanied by income velocity moving back towards (or even above) the 
long-run trend, a sign that money supply growth became subdued relative to income ex-
pansion (a direct consequence of banks reigning in credit and money expansion). 
                                                 
37 See, for instance, Altimari (2001); Neumann and Greiber (2004). 
38 See Friedman (1988); Borio and Lowe (2002); Bean (2003); Detken and Smets (2004); Srejber (2004); ECB 
(2005); Knight (2006). 
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That said, in Japan prolonged deviations of the actual income velocity of money 
from its long-term trend seem to contain valuable information for the role credit and 
money have played for the build up and later collapse of the stock market bubble. 
 
Figure 3.3.2 shows the annual growth rates of bank loans extended to the private 
sector by euro area MFIs in percent and development of the Euro Stoxx 50. The sim-
ple correlation coefficient between the two time series is high (with an R-squared of 
0.86). What is more, a simple cross-correlation analysis suggests that credit expansion 
has, in the sample period, led stock market prices.  
 
Figure 3.3.2. – Credit, money and stock prices 
(a) Bank loan growth (% y/y) and stock markets (b) M3 growth (% y/y) and stock markets
Source:  Bloomberg, own calculations.
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That said, a monetary policy that takes into account credit and money supply ex-
pansion when setting interest rates should not only be compatible with price stability – 
given that ultimately inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon. It 
would also help reducing the risk of the economy falling into a (monetary induced) fi-
nancial crisis which, in turn, could have negative and costly consequences for output 
and employment.  
 
THE LESSON TO BE LEARNED 
It is hard to see that the NRIR concept, including the Taylor rule, could qualify 
as a reliable blueprint for a monetary policy aiming at price stability in the euro area. 
First, monetary policy cannot systematically influence real output according to a pre-
set design; at least in the short-run, a systematic impact of changes in central bank 
short-term interest rates on long-term borrowing costs is hardly detectable.  
Second, monetary policy works with (unknown) time-lags on output and prices. 
As a result, a central bank that lowers rates in response to a cyclical weakening of the 
economy might de facto set into motion a pro-cyclical policy which, in turn, leads to 
unwanted cyclical swings and potential violations of price stability.  
Given the uncertainties related to the calculations of the NRIR and the concept’s 
systematic ignorance of credit and money, we are strongly in favour of a monetary 
policy that has a medium- to long-term orientation, assigning a prominent role to 
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credit and money when setting interest rates. Such a policy should not only be condu-
cive to price stability, it would also reduce the risk of the economy falling into a 
(monetary induced) financial crisis that would entail a negative impact on growth and 
employment. 
A final word might be in order. It would actually amount to a fatal conceit should 
central banker give the impression that monetary policy has the power to influence the 
real economy in a systematic fashion. It needs to be stressed that, in view of currently 
available knowledge, investment and economic growth depend largely on human capi-
tal and the prevailing institutions (such as, for instance, property rights, the economy’s 
degree of economic freedom, etc.) rather than on monetary policy.  
 
References 
Altimari, N. 2001. “Does money lead inflation in the euro area?” ECB Working Paper 63. 
Bean, C. 2003. “Asset prices, financial imbalances and monetary policy: are inflation targets enough?” 
BIS Working paper 140. 
Bernanke, B, and M. L. Gertler. 2005. „Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy 
Transmission.” NBER Working Paper 5146. http://www.nber.org/papers/w5146.pdf 
Bernhardsen, T. 2005. “The neutral real interest rate.” Norges Bank. Monetary Policy Department. 
Staff Memo 2005/1 (March). http://www.norges-bank.no/publikasjoner/staff_memo/memo-
2005-01.pdf 
Björksten, N. and Ö. Karagedikli. 2003. “Neutral real interest rates revisited.” Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand Bulletin 66 (September). 
http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/research/bulletin/2002_2006/2003sep66_3bjorkstenkaragedikli.pdf. 
Borio, C. and P. Lowe. 2002. “Asset prices, financial and monetary stability: exploring the nexus.” BIS 
Working Paper 114. 
Clark, T., and S. Kozicki. 2004. “Estimating Equilibrium Real Interest Rates in Real Time.” FRB 
Kansas City Working Paper 2004-08. http://www.kc.frb.org/Publicat/Reswkpap/RWP04-08.htm 
Detken, C. and F. Smets. 2004. “Asset price booms and monetary policy.” ECB Working Paper 364. 
ECB. 2005. “Asset price bubbles and monetary policy.” Monthly Bulletin 2005 (April) pp. 47-60. 
ECB-Observer. 2001. Can the ECB do more for growth?  http://www.ecb-
observer.com/downloads/THE%20ECBOBSERVER%20No%202.pdf 
ECB-Observer. 2002. The Fed and the ECB – why and how policies differ. http://www.ecb-
observer.com/downloads/THE%20ECBOBSERVER%20No%203.pdf 
Friedman, M. 1988. “Money and the stock market.” Journal of Political Economy  96(2) pp 221-45. 
Gali, J. 2002. “New perspectives on monetary policy, inflation, and the business cycle”, NBER, 
Working Paper 8786. 
Giammarioli, N., N. Valla. 2004. The Natural Real Interest Rate and Monetary Policy: a Review. In: 
Journal of Policy Modeling 26 pp. 641-660. 
Knight, M. 2006. “Money, credit and asset prices: (Re-)learning to read their message.” Speech for the 
ECB Colloquium, Otmar Issing's Festschrift “Monetary policy: a journey from theory to practice”, 
Frankfurt, 16-17 March 2006. http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp060317.htm. 
Wicksell, K. 2002.“Interest and Prices”, Reprints of Economic Classics, New York 1965. 
Laubach, T., J. Williams. 2003. “Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest.” The Review of Economics 
and Statistics 85(4) (November) pp. 1063-1070. 
Srejber, E. 2004. “What role do asset prices and credit play in monetary policy.” Speech within the 
Adam Smith Seminars – Thun, Switzerland. 
http://www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=13552. 
 Money matters for inflation in the euro area  
_____________________________________________________________________________________________  
47
Wu, T. 2005. “Estimating the “Neutral” Real Interest Rate in Real Time.” FRBSF Economic Letter 
2005-27 (October) pp. 1-4. http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2005/el2005-
27.pdf 
 
[\ 
 
Money matters for inflation in the euro area 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________  
 
48
PART 4 
ECB policy – review and outlook 
 
 
CONTENT: 4.1 Monetary developments in the euro area. – 4.2 Reviewing ECB rates against the Taylor 
concept. – 4.3 Euro area inflation outlook. 
 
SUMMARY: Monetary policy in the euro area has been, and still is, very expansionary according to a 
number of measures such as credit and money growth and the level of (nominal and real) short-term interest 
rates. We forecast annual consumer price inflation to be 2.3% on average in 2007 (largely a result of lower 
oil prices; and including the German 3pp VAT hike), to be followed by 2.3% in 2008. For reducing up-
ward pressure on future inflation, we recommend to raise the ECB main refinancing rate to around 4.0%. – 
The results of our money demand analyses suggest that excess liquidity has increasingly affected asset prices – 
such as bonds, stocks and possibly housing – rather than consumer prices. Against the background of our 
findings it seems to be even more important for the ECB to set interest rates in accordance with the signals 
provided by M3 growth if consumer and/or asset price inflation shall be avoided.    
 
4.1 Monetary developments in the euro area 
 
OVERVIEW 
With a growth rate of 8.1% y/y on average in the period October 2005 to Octo-
ber 2006, M3 expansion has remained exceptionally strong (Figure 4.1.1 (a)). As a re-
sult of money supply growing persistently above the ECB’s 4½% reference value, ex-
cess liquidity, as defined by, for instance, the real money gap on the basis of M3 (and M3 
corrected for portfolio shifts), has been drifting upwards (see Figure 4.1.1 (b)). In fact, 
measures of excess liquidity suggest substantial inflationary potential coming from 
monetary expansion.  
 
Figure 4.1.1. – Euro area money growth and “excess liquidity” 
(a) M3 growth (% y/y) (b) Measures of "excess liqudity" (%)
Source: ECB, Thomson Financial; own calcuations. 
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Figure 4.1.2 (a) shows the income velocity of M3 (that is nominal GDP divided 
by M3) for the period 1980-Q1 to 2006-Q2. In addition, a linear trend line (calculated 
for the period 1980-Q1 to 2001-Q4, and extrapolated thereafter) is shown. The devia-
tion of the actual income velocity from its long-run trend is depicted in Figure 4.1.2 
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(b). The deviation – which can be interpreted as a measure of excess money holdings – has 
reached the highest level in the sample period under review.  
 
Figure 4.1.2. – M3 income velocity  
(a) Income velocity of M3, actual and trend (b) "Excess liquidity"
Source:  ECB, Thomson Financials; own calculations.
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So far, the impact of excess liquidity on consumer prices has been relatively mod-
est. As Figure 4.1.3 (a) shows, money supply growth has remained high by historical 
standards, while consumer price inflation has been running close to the ECB’s 2% up-
per ceiling. However, such a finding is by no means a reason for complacency as far as 
monetary developments are concerned. In particular, it might be premature to call into 
question the role of money for inflation in the euro area.39  
 
A brief look at price developments in the euro area 
Since October 2005 to October 2006, HICP inflation was 2.3% on average, thus 
exceeding the ECB’s upper ceiling of price stability definition (see charts (a) to (d)); 
only in September 2005 dropped inflation to below 2.0%, driven by the sharp decline 
in oil prices. Core inflation has remained well contained, with a 1.4% y/y rise on aver-
age in the last 12 months. However, since the beginning of 2006, the decline of core 
inflation – which set in around the beginning of 2002 – seems to have come to a halt.  
 
SELECTED PRICE MEASURES IN THE EURO AREA 
                                                 
39 In this context see, for instance, the Portugese central bank, which, after reviewing the stability of 
the money demand model suggested by Calza, Gerdesmeier and Levy (2001) and Carstensen (2004 a, 
b), concluded: “(…) the recent evidence raises serious doubts regarding the use of M3 as an indicator 
for evaluating the risks to price stability.” Banco de Portugal, Economic Bulletin, Summer 2006, p. 
51.  
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(b) Producer price inflation* (%) (d) Euro area labour cost index (% y/y)
Source:  Bloomberg, own estimates. *Producer prices excluding construction
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Price developments at the producer level suggest that some pipeline pressure has 
been building up lately. So far, however, the annual changes in nominal labour costs 
seem to have remained on a downward trend, which set in around 2000. It should also 
be noted here that firms’ and consumers’ price expectations (regarding price moves in 
the coming 12 months) have started to drift upwards (in particular in Germany, pre-
sumably related to the VAT hike as from 1 January 2007).  
 
FIRMS’ AND CONSUMERS’ PRICE EXPECTATIONS 
(a) Firms' selling price expecations, coming 12-mths (b) Consumers' expected price trends, coming 12-mths
Source:  Bloomberg, own estimates. 
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Finally, the charts below show the break even inflation rates (derived from 
French government inflation linked bonds) and the bonds’ real yield component. 
Break even inflation rates for longer maturities have remained above the ECB’s upper 
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2% ceiling. Inflation expectations for the more medium-term, however, seem to have 
improved lately, as evidenced by break even inflation rates for the linker maturing in 
July 2029. 
 
EURO AREA BREAK EVEN INFLATION AND REAL YIELDS (%) 
(a) Break-even inflation of OATs in percent (b) Real yields of OATs in percent
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Source: Bloomberg; own calculations. 
 
Figure 4.1.3. – M3 and price indices 
(a) M3 and consumer prices (% y/y) (b) M3 and house prices (% y/y)
Source:  ECB, Thomson Financials; own calculations. Quarterly data for M3. Annual data for property prices, starting 1981, 
interpolated; as from 1996: semi-annual data, interpolated.
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The key issue is this: Excess liquidity, which has been building up in the last years, 
might have increasingly affected asset prices – such as bonds, stocks and real estate 
prices (which are not, or not fully, accounted for in measures of price inflation of 
products and services produced in the current period) – rather than consumer prices. 
Asset price inflation might thus have the potential to (temporarily) cloud, e.g. distort, the 
traditional link between money and consumer prices.   
Figure 4.1.3 (b) plots money supply growth rates together with annual changes in 
the euro area residential property price index. Since the second half of the 1990s, 
property price inflation has been, on average, closely related to money expansion. This 
Money matters for inflation in the euro area 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________  
 
52
finding could indeed indicate that excess money growth has been accompanied by 
property price inflation rather consumer price inflation.  
As noted above, the information content of money for inflation in the euro area 
has been put into question – and thus the rationale for assigning a prominent role to 
money in the ECB monetary policy strategy.40 In view of the historic long-run relation 
between money growth and consumer price inflation, however, such a conclusion 
might indeed be premature and even preposterous (see box below).   
 
The long-run link between money growth and inflation 
In their efforts to maintain low inflation, today’s central banks tend to pay relatively 
little attention to the growth rate of money supply. This may come as a surprise, given 
that many studies suggest a close relationship between money growth and inflation, at 
least in the long run. But how long must money growth be “strong” before it should be 
of concern to policymakers?41  
Chart (a) below depicts annual M3 growth in the euro area and the annual change 
in the consumer price index for the period January 1971 to September 2006. The sim-
ple correlation coefficient of the contemporaneous series is 0.78. Chart (b) plots two 
year averages, for which the correlation coefficient rises to 0.83. Lengthening the aver-
aging to four and six years (charts (c) and (d), respectively), the link between money 
growth and inflation becomes even closer, as indicated by correlation coefficients of 
0.91 and 0.93, respectively.   
 
                                                 
40 In this context see, for instance, ECB (2003), Background Studies for the ECB’s Evaluation of its 
Monetary Policy Strategy, November, Frankfurt, pp. 187 and, in particular pp. 245 for an overview on 
money demand stability: “First and foremost, there is strong evidence favouring the hypothesis that there 
is a stable long-run relationship between real money and real GDP.” (p. 293) 
41 This box draws heavily on Fitzgerald, T. (1999), Money Growth and Inflation: How Long is the 
Long-Run? In: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.  
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Annual M3 growth and consumer price inflation in the euro area (%)
(a) Annual growth rates (b) 2-year average
(c) 4-year average (d) 6-year average
Source:  Thomson Financials; own calculations.
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Of course, on a month-to-month and quarter-to-quarter basis, the relation be-
tween money and inflation might not be well understood. But the simple illustration 
above should serve as a reminder that ignoring money supply changes (for too long a 
period of time) might be unwise, as it runs the risk of translating into inflation later 
on. 
The long-run relationship between money and inflation suggests a straightforward 
strategy for maintaining low inflation: choose the growth rate of money that corresponds 
to the desired long-run rate of inflation. In fact, some economists have concluded from 
this evidence that the problem of controlling inflation has been successfully solved.42 
 
FINANCIAL MARKET TURMOIL AND MONEY HOLDINGS 
In the period 2001 to 2003, international stock market gyrations increased consid-
erably, accompanied by an exceptionally strong increase in the stock of M3 (see Figure 
4.1.4). So it might be that the recent turmoil in global financial markets might have led 
to a (temporary, if not persistent) rise in (cautionary) money holdings in the euro area. 
 
 
                                                 
42 See, for instance, Lucas, R. E. (1986), Adaptive Behavior and Economic Theory, Journal of Business, 
vol. 59, No. 4, October 1986, p. 402. He makes it clear that this assertion applies to long-run averages of 
money growth and inflation.  
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Figure 4.1.4. – International stock market developments 
German DAX and DAX-volatility US S&P500 and S&P500-volatility
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Source: Bloomberg; own calculations. – Shaded areas represent periods of „elevated” stock market 
volatility.  
 
When it comes to analysing the long-run relation between money, output interest 
rates and inflation, it might thus be insightful to explicitly take into account the latest 
period of financial market crisis. By doing so, we will contrast official M3 develop-
ments with two additional money supply series, namely (i) “M3 adjusted for portfolio 
shifts” (as published by the ECB) and – as a kind of control variable – (ii) “M3 ad-
justed for higher money holdings” (as calculated by ECB Observer).  
 
Figure 4.1.5. – Money growth and demand deviation from mean 
(a) Annual growth rates of M3  
aggregatesa 
(b) Deviations of money holdings from 
long-run equilibriumb 
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Source: ECB, Thomson Financials; own estimates. – aFourth differences of log values. – bEstimated 
using a simple OLS regression. Note that the null hypothesis of a unit root can only be rejected for 
the aggregate M3 adjusted for portfolio shifts (ECB Observer) according to ADF-tests. 
 
The latter was estimated using a simple money demand function (specified for 
1980-Q1 to 2001-Q4)43, based on real GDP, the long-term interest rate and a shift 
dummy, the latter taking the value of 0 from 1980-Q1 to 2000-Q4, thereafter rising 
                                                 
43 In the literature, this period is actually unanimously considered to be a period of a stable long-run 
demand function in the euro area.  
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linearly from 1 in 2001-Q1 to 12 in 2003-Q4, and remaining at that level for the rest 
of the sample period.  
Figure 4.1.5 (a) shows the annual growth rates of the three M3 aggregates under 
review. Most notably, all three aggregates have shown very strong growth since around 
the end of 2004. Just for the sake of illustration, Figure 4.1.5 (b) shows the residuals of 
OLS estimates of real money demand (specified as outlined above) for the three 
money stocks under review. As can be seen, all residuals suggest a rather large level of 
excess liquidity.  
Figure 4.1.6. (a) shows the level of official stock of M3 and the levels of money 
stocks adjusted for portfolio effects (that is the ECB’s and ECB Observer’s aggregate). 
The latter are – due to taking account of portfolio shifts – lower than the former. Fig-
ure 4.1.6 (b) shows the respective income velocities of money. As can be seen, the in-
come velocities of the ECB’s adjusted stock of M3 and ECB Observer’s M3 show a 
(much) less pronounced decline compared to the velocity calculated on the basis of 
the official stock of M3.  
 
Figure 4.1.6. – Stock of M3 and income velocities 
(a) Stock of M3 (€bn, logs) (b) Income velocities 
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Source: ECB, Thomson Financials; own calculations. – The income velocity is defined as nominal 
GDP divided by stock of M3.  
 
A DEMAND FOR MONEY  
Turning to some further empirical estimates, we tested a demand function for real 
M3 holdings, which was specified as follows: 
1,43210 ttt
s
tttt svßßißyßßpm επ +++++=− , 
where tt pm −  is the real money holding (in logs), ty  is real income, sti  is the short-
term yield (which implies a semi-log interest rate elasticity), tπ  is inflation (first differ-
ences of log consumer prices, annualized), tsv  market volatility (as specified in Figure 
4.1.7 (b)), and ε the i.i.d. error term.  
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Figure 4.1.7. – Stock market and stock market volatility 
(a) Stock market, real (logs)a (b) Stock market volatilityb 
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Source: ECB, Thomson Financials; own calculations. – aDeflated with GDP deflator. – bStandard de-
viation of weekly changes of stock prices (first differences in log values) over a gliding 52 week win-
dow.  
 
Figure 4.1.8. – Trace and max-eigenvalue tests, estimated cointegration parameters, 
forward recursive estimates, official M3 
Parameter estimates  
Sample 
period 
 
Trace sta-
tistic 
 
Max-eigen  
statistic )(1 yß  )(2
liß  )(3 πß  )(4 svß  
1981Q1 
2002Q4 
72.83* 29.62 1.08 
(0.81) 
-0.24 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
0.001 
(0.00) 
1981Q1 
2003Q4 
74.55* 30.33 1.25 
(0.25) 
-0.08 
(0.02) 
0.09 
(0.02) 
0.005 
(0.001) 
1981Q1 
2004Q4 
71.29* 29.12 1.24 
(0.11) 
-0.04 
(0.01) 
0.04 
(0.01) 
0.001 
(0.00) 
1981Q1 
2005Q4 
69.61* 29.51 1.21 
(0.09) 
-0.03 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
1981Q1 
2006Q2 
70.77* 29.82 1.22 
(0.09) 
-0.03 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
Legend: * (**) denotes significance at the 0.05 (0.01) level. – Standard errors in ( . ) brackets. – Using 
MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values.  
 
Analysing the long-run relation between the variables under review, we applied 
the Johansen technique (1991, 1995). The cointegration system uses an unrestricted 
constant, allowing for a linear trend in the variables but not in the cointegration rela-
tionships. The lag length of the VAR was determined by the Schwarz criterion, which 
suggested one quarter. Due to high autocorrelation in the residuals, however, we de-
cided for a lag length of 2 quarters.  
 
Estimating a demand for money function  
Let’s assume you would want to explore the relation between real money (M/P) 
and output (Y). The regression equation would be:  
(1) ttot YßPM εβ ++= 1)/( , 
 Money matters for inflation in the euro area  
_____________________________________________________________________________________________  
57
where M = money supply, P = price level and ε  is the i.i.d. (white noise) error term; t 
denotes time.  
If M/P and Y are cointegrated, there is a long-run equilibrium between the two se-
ries. Of course, in the short-run, the relation between M/P and Y might be in disequi-
librium. However, over time, the disequilibrium should disappear if M/P and Y are 
cointegrated. 
The so-called error correction mechanism (ECM), popularised by Engle and 
Granger (1987), corrects for any such disequilibria over time. Consider the following 
first difference model: 
(2) tttttt uPMYYPM ++∆+∆+∆+=∆ −−− 14131210 )/()/( εβββββ , 
where ∆ denotes the change (or first difference) of the variables; 1−tε  is the error cor-
rection term, that is the one-period lagged value of the residuals of equation (1); u is 
the i.i.d. error term.  
That said, equation (2) includes the equilibrium error in the previous period. If the 
coefficient 4β  is statistically significant, it tells us that part of the disequilibrium in 
M/P in the previous period is corrected in the next period.  
However, the Engle-Granger approach has several defects. First, it does not tell us 
whether variables under review are exogenous or endogenous. Second, any error intro-
duced in the first step of the Engle-Granger procedure (estimating the long-run rela-
tion (1)) is carried into step two (estimating the first difference equation (2)).  
This is why empirical research has turned towards using the Johansen (1988) and 
Sock and Watson (1988) procedures, which rely heavily on the relationship between 
the rank of the matrix and its characteristic roots, thereby trying to solve the problems 
related to the Engle-Granger approach.  
 
We applied the Johansen procedure to the long-run relation between real money 
and various explanatory variables for various sample periods (see Figure 4.1.8). For all 
periods under review we find at least one cointegration vector according to the Trace 
statistic. In all sample periods, the income elasticity of money demand exceeds unity 
and remains fairly stable from sample period to sample period.  
Whether or not the cointegration relationship can be interpreted as a demand for 
money function, however, must be inferred from the error correction model. For the 
full sample period (and in contrast to analyses made for the period 1980-Q1 to 2001-
Q4), we find that monetary overhangs are either no longer statistically significant in the 
equation for changes in real money demand or are statistically significant for changes 
in real money demand and also for changes in consumer price inflation, stock market 
volatility and the long-term bond yield.   
That said, excess liquidity appears to have increasingly affected bond and stock 
prices lately, potentially causing asset price inflation.44 Such a hypothesis, if proved to be 
true, would support the conclusion that consumer price inflation and/or the GDP de-
                                                 
44 In this context see Gerdesmeier, D., Polleit, T. (2005), Measures of excess liquidity, HfB Working 
Paper No. 65 (www.hfb.de).  
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flator (which include the prices of goods and services produced in the current period) 
might no longer appropriate to measure the loss of purchasing power induced by ex-
cess money growth.  
 
A DEMAND FOR MONEY AND ASSET PRICES 
To find out a bit more about where excess liquidity might be going, we formu-
lated an alternative long-run function for real money demand:  
1,1,61,51,41,31,21,11,0 tttt
s
t
l
tttt svßsßßißißyßßpm επ +++++++=− , 
where sti  is the short-term rates and ts is the real stock market performance.45  
Using real money, real output, short- and long-term interest rates, inflation, real 
stock market and its volatility, Johansen’s trace and max-eigenvalue statistics suggest 
the existence of one cointegration vector. However, we identify long-run relations be-
tween short- and long-term interest rates and inflation, and real GDP and real stock 
markets and its volatility. As a result, we decided to work with the following system:  
(i)  1,1,61,41,21,11,0 tttltttt svßßißyßßpm επ +++++=−  
(ii)     2,2,62,52,42,32,0 ttttstlt svßsßßißßi επ +++++=  
(iii)      3,3,63,13,0 tttt svßyßßs ε+++= . 
The first equation represents the long-run demand function for real balances.46 
The second function captures the combined Fisher equation (relating long-term rates 
to inflation), the term structure of interest (relating long- to short-rates) and the sub-
stitution effect between bond and stock market investments The third equation relates 
real output to the real stock market performance and its volatility.  
Again, the cointegration system uses an unrestricted constant, allowing for a lin-
ear trend in the variables but not in the cointegration relationships. The length of the 
VAR was determined by the Schwarz criterion, which suggests lag of 1, rejecting the 
null hypothesis of at most one vector at the 0.05 level (Trace statistic). However, in 
view of the economic relations outlined above, we decided to opt for 3 vectors and a 
lag of 3 quarters.  
In the following, we will present and briefly comment the estimation results for 
the demand function of (i) official M3, (ii) M3 adjusted for portfolio shifts as calcu-
lated by the ECB and, as a kind of control variable, (iii) M3 adjusted for changes in li-
quidity preferences (as calculated by ECB Observer). Finally, we will (iv) put the re-
sults into perspective.   
 
RE (I): DEMAND FOR OFFICIAL M3  
The matrix below shows the results of the cointegration analysis for euro area 
money demand for the period 1980-Q1 to 2006-Q2. The first row looks like a long-
                                                 
45 All variables included are non-stationary according to ADF-test results (even though inflation 
could be trend-stationary in the sample period under review). 
46 Note that one could argue that neither interest rates nor inflation nor stock market volatility should 
enter the long-run demand for money function: given that such variables should be I(0) in the long-
run, they should influence short-term, but not long-term real balance holdings. 
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run money demand relationship. Income elasticity of money demand is 1.33 (in line 
with the findings of various other pre-crisis studies). Also, the (constant) interest elas-
ticity of money demand is negative and has a plausible magnitude.  
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Chi-square (4) = 2.16 [0.54], standard errors in brackets. 
 
Figure 4.1.9 (a) shows the residuals of the long-run demand for real money func-
tion. Figure (b) depicts the equivalent for the asset markets (combining the Fisher 
equation, the term-structure of interest and the substitution effect of stock market 
versus bond market), and Figure (c) plots the relation between real GDP, real stock 
markets, and its volatility.   
 
 
 
Figure 4.1.9. – Cointegration results, deviations from equilibrium 
(a) Money demand (b) Asset markets (c) Stock-GDP relation 
-.08
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
.08
.10
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005  
.025
.020
.015
.010
.005
.000
.005
.010
.015
.020
.025
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
-.08
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
.08
.10
.12
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005  
Source: ECB, Thomson Financials; own estimates.  
 
Augmented-Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests for stationarity suggest that, for the period 
under review, the null hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals of the long-run rela-
tions can be rejected at the 5% level. Whether or not the first cointegration relation 
can be interpreted as a demand for money function, however, must be inferred from 
error correction models.  
Turning to first difference equations, we find that the lagged error correction 
term of the long-run real money demand function does not prove to be statistically 
significant for explaining changes in real money demand (see Figure 4.1.10). That said, 
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the monetary overhang is not corrected via higher consumer price inflation/GDP de-
flator.  
 
Figure 4.1.10. – Results of the first difference equation (official M3) 
 ∆( tt pm − ) ∆( ty ) ∆( lti ) ∆( sti ) ∆( tπ ) ∆( ts ) ∆( tsv ) 
Lags 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
1ECT  -0.031 0.0100 -0.037 -0.061 11.909 -1.270 -0.023 
 -0.024 -0.023 -0.017 -0.021 -5.233 -0.550 -0.014 
 [-1.293] [ 0.4366] [-2.076] [-2.832] [ 2.275] [-2.306] [-1.985] 
2ECT  -0.281 0.1373 -0.294 -0.219 64.093 -0.131 -0.002 
 -0.092 -0.086 -0.067 -0.081 -19.71 -2.075 -0.055 
 [-3.049] [ 1.582] [-4.362] [-2.685] [ 3.250] [-0.063] [-0.034] 
3ECT  -0.020 -0.058 -0.018 0.052 -6.110 0.759 -0.026 
 -0.026 -0.024 -0.019 -0.023 -5.627 -0.592 -0.015 
 [-0.788] [-2.378] [-0.982] [ 2.253] [-1.085] [ 1.281] [-1.665] 
R2 0.49 0.47 0.52 0.54 0.58 0.36 0.40 
Legend: Standard errors below, t-values in [ . ]. – ECT represent the error correction terms as calcu-
lated from the long-run estimates. – Period: 1980-Q1 to 2006-Q2. 
 
However, excess money seems to affect long bond yields, the short-term rate, the 
change in inflation, and changes in stock market valuations and its volatility, as ex-
pressed by the statistical significance of the error correction term of the long-run 
money demand function in the respective first difference equations.  
 
Figure 4.1.11. – Estimated cointegration parameters and trace tests, forward recursive 
estimates, official M3 
Sample pe-
riod 
Income elas-
ticity 
Interest rate 
elasticity 
Stock market 
volatility 
Trace statis-
tic 
Max-eigen 
statistic 
1981-Q1 
2002-Q4 
1.23 
(0.03) 
-0.80 
(0.17) 
2.48 
(0.54) 
153.67* 50.02* 
1981-Q1 – 
2003-Q4 
1.18 
(0.04) 
-0.97 
(0.18) 
3.28 
(0.67) 
155.72* 54.78* 
1981-Q1 – 
2004-Q4 
1.22 
(0.05) 
-1.16 
(0.20) 
4.67 
(0.76) 
156.46* 60.06* 
1981-Q1 – 
2005-Q4 
1.26 
(0.06) 
-1.60 
(0.28) 
4.68 
(0.63) 
145.53* 46.23* 
1981-Q1 – 
2006-Q2 
1.32 
(0.07) 
-1.62 
(0.31) 
5.05 
(0.63) 
144.05* 58.69* 
Legend: * (**) denotes significance at the 0.05 (0.01) level. – Using McKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) 
p-values.  
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Figure 4.1.12. – Recursive coefficient estimates for the long-run demand for official 
M3 
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Source: ECB, Thomson Financials; own calculations. – The recursive coefficients show the evolution of 
estimates for the coefficients under review as sample data is added to the estimate. If the coefficient exhibits 
significant variations as the number of data added to the estimate is increased, it might be interpreted as a sign 
if instability. – The dotted lines represent two standard error bands. – Legend: C(1) = income elasticity, C(2) = 
interest rate elasticity (short rate), C(3) = stock market volatility and C(4) = constant.  
Looking into parameter stability of the (assumed) long-run money demand func-
tion, recursive estimation techniques were applied (Dreger, Wolters (2006)). Table 
4.1.11 shows the results from this exercise.47 Overall, the relationships appear to be 
stable, also after the turbulent period in 2001. In any case, the cointegration finding 
can be confirmed for all sample periods under review.  
Just for illustrative purposes, Figure 4.1.12 shows the recursive estimates of the 
coefficients of the long-run demand function according to a simple OLS estimate of 
the money demand function as specified above. Here, income elasticity of money de-
mand has remained fairly stable in the sample period. Recently, however, interest rate 
and stock market volatility elasticity of money demand has increased (somewhat).  
 
RE (II): DEMAND FOR M3 ADJUSTED FOR PORTFOLIO SHIFTS (ECB) 
Using M3 adjusted for portfolio shifts (ECB), income and interest rate elasticity 
of money are now slightly lower than those estimated for the official M3 demand 
function (see matrix below).  
 
                                                 
47 We started with 2002, given that the periods before have been associated with a stable demand for 
money function in the euro area.  
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Chi-square (4) = 1.667 [0.79], standard errors in brackets. 
 
Figure 4.1.13. – Cointegration results, deviations from equilibrium 
(a) Money demand (b) Asset markets (c) Stock-GDP relation 
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Source: ECB, Thomson Financials; own estimates.  
Figure 4.1.13 (a) to (c) show the residuals of the long-run equations. According to 
ADF-tests the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected for all series at the 0.05 
level. Figure 4.1.14 shows the results of the first difference equations. Here, the error 
correction term of the long-run real money demand function proves to be statistically 
significant in the first difference equation for real money demand. The monetary 
overhang is thus corrected via affecting the price level. At the same time, however, the 
monetary overhang seems also to affect long- and short-term interest rates.  
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Figure 4.1.14. – Results of the first difference equation (M3 adjusted for portfolio 
shifts (ECB)) 
 ∆( tt pm − ) ∆( ty ) ∆( lti ) ∆( sti ) ∆( tπ ) ∆( ts ) ∆( tsv ) 
Lags 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
1ECT  -0.081 0.005 -0.041 -0.067 11.577 -1.115 -0.022 
 -0.024 -0.026 -0.020 -0.0246 -5.982 -0.629 -0.017 
 [-3.335] [ 0.195] [-2.009] [-2.727] [ 1.935] [-1.771] [-1.333] 
2ECT  -0.287 0.127 -0.292 -0.194 57.460 1.1911 0.0024 
 -0.081 -0.086 -0.068 -0.0821 -19.933 -2.097 -0.056 
 [-3.540] [ 1.468] [-4.264] [-2.364] [ 2.882] [ 0.567] [ 0.042] 
3ECT  0.0126 -0.053 -0.022 0.039 -3.438 0.400 -0.034 
 -0.020 -0.021 -0.017 -0.020 -4.985 -0.524 -0.014 
 [ 0.623] [-2.440] [-1.305] [ 1.923] [-0.689] [ 0.764] [-2.44] 
R2 0.52 0.47 0.511 0.532 0.576 0.352 0.379 
Legend: Standard errors below, t-values in [ . ]. – ECT represent the error correction terms as calcu-
lated from the long-run estimates. – Period: 1980-Q1 to 2006-Q2. 
 
Figure 4.1.15. – Estimated cointegration parameters and trace tests, forward recursive 
estimates, M3 adjusted for portfolio shifts 
Sample pe-
riod 
Income elas-
ticity 
Interest rate 
elasticity 
Stock market 
volatility 
Trace statis-
tic 
Max-eigen 
statistic 
1981-Q1 – 
2002-Q4 
1.24 
(0.02) 
0.37 
(0.13) 
1.49 
(0.41) 
164.72* 63.00* 
1981-Q1 – 
2003-Q4 
1.25 
(0.03) 
0.33 
(0.12) 
2.23 
(0.51) 
165.69* 66.95* 
1981-Q1 – 
2004-Q4 
1.25 
(0.03) 
0.55 
(0.13) 
2.70 
(0.51) 
158.87* 61.08* 
1981-Q1 – 
2005-Q4 
1.29 
(0.05) 
1.08 
(0.23) 
3.34 
(0.49) 
139.29* 54.52* 
1981-Q1 – 
2006-Q2 
1.27 
(0.06) 
1.39 
(0.29) 
3.95 
(0.53) 
134.79* 54.69* 
Legend: * (**) denotes significance at the 0.05 (0.01) level. – Using MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) 
p-values.  
 
Figure 4.1.15 shows the forward recursive estimated cointegration parameters. 
Overall, the relationships seem to be relatively stable, and in all sample periods the 
cointegation relation prevails. Again for illustrative purposes, Figure 4.1.16 shows the 
OLS recursive coefficient estimates for the real money demand function. Income elas-
ticity has remained fairly stable throughout the period under review. What is more, the 
recent increases in the coefficients for interest rates and stock market volatility are 
now considerably smaller when compared with the estimates for official M3.  
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Figure 4.1.16. – Recursive coefficient estimates for the long-run demand for M3 cor-
rected for portfolio shifts (ECB) 
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Source: ECB, Thomson Financials; own calculations. – The recursive coefficients show the evo-
lution of estimates for the coefficients under review as sample data is added to the estimate. If the 
coefficient exhibits significant variations as the number of data added to the estimate is increased, it 
might be interpreted as a sign of instability. – The dotted lines represent two standard error bands. – 
Legend: C(1) = income elasticity, C(2) = interest rate elasticity (short rate), C(3) = stock market vola-
tility and C(4) = constant.  
 
RE (III): DEMAND FOR M3 ADJUSTED FOR CHANGES IN LIQUIDITY PREFERENCE 
(ECB OBSERVER) 
Using the stock of M3 adjusted for portfolio shifts (as calculated by ECB Ob-
server), the cointegration analysis yields the following results: 
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Chi-square (4) = 4.644 [0.33], standard errors in brackets. 
 
Income elasticity is now slightly higher than in the previous two estimates, 
whereas interest elasticity is considerably lower. Figure 4.1.17 (a) to (c) shows the de-
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viations of actual values from their long-run equilibrium estimates. The null hypothe-
sis of a unit root can be rejected for all series at the 0.05 level according to ADF-tests.  
 
Figure 4.1.17. – Cointegration results, deviations from equilibrium 
(a) Money demand (b) Asset markets (c) Stock-GDP relation 
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Source: ECB, Thomson Financials; own estimates.  
 
Figure 4.1.18. – Results of the first difference equation (M3 adjusted for portfolio 
shifts (ECB Observer)) 
 ∆( tt pm − ) ∆( ty ) ∆( lti ) ∆( sti ) ∆( tπ ) ∆( ts ) ∆( tsv ) 
Lags 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
1ECT  -0.129 0.0215 0.001 -0.096 15.189 0.291 -0.038 
 0.038 0.037 0.0287 0.0348 8.559 0.901 0.023 
 [-3.342] [ 0.574] [ 0.003] [-2.771] [ 1.774] [ 0.323] [-1.633] 
2ECT  -0.222 0.044 -0.301 -0.116 36.588 1.746 0.055 
 0.093 0.090 0.069 0.084 20.689 2.179 0.056 
 [-2.374] [ 0.489] [-4.340] [-1.378] [ 1.768] [ 0.801] [ 0.971] 
3ECT  -0.025 -0.037 -0.035 0.010 2.366 -0.155 -0.040 
 0.018 0.0183 0.013 0.0170 4.171 0.439 0.011 
 [-1.369] [-2.061] [-2.557] [ 0.636] [ 0.567] [-0.353] [-3.521] 
R2 0.53 0.45 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.33 0.41 
Legend: Standard errors below, t-values in [ . ]. – ECT represent the error correction terms as calcu-
lated from the long-run estimates. – Period: 1980-Q1 to 2006-Q2. 
 
The monetary overhang proves to be statistically significant in the first difference 
equation for long-run real money holdings, indicating that monetary overhangs are 
corrected over time by changes in real money holdings (see Figure 4.1.18). The mone-
tary overhang, however, proves also to be statistically significant for the changes in 
short-term rates; this finding might merely reflect the ECB’s reaction function.  
Again, for illustrative purposes, Figure 4.1.19 depicts the recursive estimates of 
the long-run money demand function using M3 adjusted for portfolio effects as calcu-
lated by ECB Observer. Eyeballing the coefficients suggests that the parameters under 
review have remained fairly stable in the period under review.  
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Figure 4.1.19. – Recursive coefficient estimates for the long-run demand for M3 cor-
rected for portfolio shifts (ECB) 
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Source: ECB, Thomson Financials; own calculations. – The recursive coefficients show the evo-
lution of estimates for the coefficients under review as sample data is added to the estimate. If the 
coefficient exhibits significant variations as the number of data added to the estimate is increased, it 
might be interpreted as a sign of instability. – The dotted lines represent two standard error bands. – 
Legend: C(1) = income elasticity, C(2) = interest rate elasticity (short rate), C(3) = stock market vola-
tility and C(4) = constant.  
 
RE (IV): SUMMARY 
Figure 4.1.20 (a) shows three measures of excess liquidity, namely (i) the long-run 
deviation of official M3 demand from its equilibrium according to the cointegration 
models, and (ii) residuals of two OLS regressions using money demand specifications 
on the basis of M3 adjusted for portfolio shifts and M3 adjusted for changes in liquid-
ity preference. As can be seen, all measures indicate a considerable build up of excess 
liquidity in the euro area in recent years.  
Figure 4.1.20 (b) plots excess liquidity (calculated on the basis of official M3) with 
annual house price inflation. The fit between the two series is rather striking: it sug-
gests that strong money expansion has been associated with inflating house prices in 
the euro area. This indeed could indicate that there is actually more in official M3 than meets 
the eye when it comes to inflationary pressures in the euro area. To put it more suc-
cinctly: If there is a monetary policy problem, it might not be related to M3, it might be related to 
measuring inflation.  
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Figure 4.1.20. – Measures of excess liquidity and house price inflation 
(a) Measures of 
“excess liquidity” 
(b) “Excess liquidity”a and house 
price inflation 
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Source: ECB, Thomson Financials; own estimates. –aResidual of the long-run money demand func-
tions on the basis of official M3. 
 
As is commonly known, money supply changes work with long and usually uncer-
tain time-lags on the economy and its price level. That said, it cannot be excluded that 
the money supply increases seen in recent years might hold in store a considerable po-
tential for consumer price inflation going forward.  
Alternatively, excess liquidity might also trigger unfavourable developments in fi-
nancial asset markets. In view of strong increases in asset prices, in particular housing, 
stocks and bonds, an exogenous shock could actually trigger a sharp downward cor-
rection of elevated prices which, in turn, could exacerbate the costs of a financial and 
economic crisis.  
In sum, we conclude that it appears to be increasingly important for the ECB, 
which has the mandate of preserving the purchasing power of the euro, to set interest 
rates in accordance with the signals provided by (trend) money supply growth, that is 
(trend) excess liquidity. This is, because at the end of the day, the consequences of as-
set price inflation should be equal to those of traditional consumer price inflation – a 
debasement of the value of money.  
   
4.2 Reviewing ECB rates against the Taylor concept 
According to the Taylor (1993) concept, the central bank should set its nominal 
interest in response to the level of growth and inflation. In such a normative interpretation, 
a comparison between the actual central bank rate with the Taylor rate should allow an 
assessment of the monetary policy stance: if the actual rate is higher (lower) than the Tay-
lor rate, monetary policy would be restrictive (expansionary) by this measure.  
Using Taylor’s equation, the nominal Taylor rate can be calculated as follows: 
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* p
ttttt yyrf −−−− −⋅+−++= πππ , 
where *tf  is the implied ECB refinancing rate, r is the long-run equilibrium real short-term inter-
est rate, πt –1 is the previous period’s annual inflation (measured on the basis of the con-
sumer price index), yt–1 is the log of the previous period’s level of real gross domestic 
product (GDP), and pty 1−  is the log of an estimate of the previous period’s level of poten-
tial output (which is approximated by using the HP-Filter). We calculate the Taylor rate 
for five alternative target inflation rates: π* = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 percent.  
 
Figure 4.2.1. – ECB refinancing rate and Taylor rates 
(a) ECB rate and inflation targets (%) (b) ECB rate, output gap and inflation gap (%)*
Source:  Thomson Financials, Bloomberg; own calculations. * Inflation gap calculated on the basis of a 2% inflation target.
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Figure 4.2.1 (a) shows, for the period Q1 91 to Q3 06, the ECB refinancing rate 
(before 1999-Q1: Bundesbank rate) together with various Taylor interest rates calcu-
lated on the basis of alternative levels of envisaged (target) inflation. Assuming a real 
equilibrium interest rate of 1.9% p.a. (corresponding to the estimated long-term growth 
rate of the euro area economy), actual ECB rates have remained below the level as rec-
ommended by the Taylor rule since the end of 2001.  
For instance, the Taylor rate on the basis of envisaged inflation of, say, 2.0% would 
have been 4.3% in Q3 06, contrasting with an actual rate of just 3.0% in September.48    
Figure 4.2.1 (b) shows the output and inflation gap in the euro area. The inflation 
gap has been positive most of the time since the beginning of the single currency un-
ion. Lately, the output gap has also turned into positive territory. That said, both 
components of the Taylor interest rate are recommending higher ECB rates.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48 This can be explained as follows: real rate of 1.9% plus envisaged inflation of 2.0% plus output gap 
of .7% times .5 plus inflation gap of .1% (that is the average of monthly HICP inflation in Q3 06 of 
2.1% minus 2.0%) times .5. 
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Figure 4.2.2. – ECB real rates and economic growth 
(a) ECB real rates (%) and real GDP growth (% y/y)
Source:  Thomson Financials, Bloomberg; own calculations. 
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The same point can be made by simply contrasting real ECB rates with real eco-
nomic expansion rates (Figure 4.2.2). Real short-term rates have remained well below 
actual GDP expansion since the middle of 2003. Overall, the review of a simple nor-
mative Taylor rule would suggest that real (and nominal) short-term ECB interest 
rates have remained at very low levels in recent years. In view of a positive output and 
inflation gap, the Taylor rule would actually support an increase in ECB short-term in-
terest rates.  
 
 
4.3 Euro area inflation outlook  
 
Back in September 2005, ECB Observer forecast annual euro area HICP inflation 
to be 2.5% on average in 2006, indicating that there would be little hope for inflation 
to fall below the ECB’s upper 2.0% ceiling anytime soon. At that point in time, ECB 
staff inflation projections gave a mid-point inflation outlook of 1.9% for 2006.49   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49 According to current information, inflation is most likely to average out at 2.2% this year, largely 
driven by the sharp drop in oil prices. 
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4.3.1. – Forecast assumptions 
  GDP1) 
growth 
 
GDP2) 
trend 
growth  
M33) 
growth 
 
Oil pri-
ce4) 
(US-$) 
EURO-
USD5) 
2006 Q2 2.7 2.2 8.5 58.0 1.28 
 Q3 2.6 2.1 9.0 57.0 1.27 
 Q4 2.4 2.1 8.5 55.0 1.29 
2007 Q1 2.2 2.0 8.0 55.0 1.25 
 Q2 2.0 2.0 7.5 55.0 1.25 
 Q3 2.0 2.0 7.0 55.0 1.25 
 Q4 2.0 2.0 7.0 55.0 1.25 
2008 Q1–Q4  2.0 2.0 7.0 55.0 1.25 
Legend: 1) real gross domestic product (GDP), annual change (%), seasonally adjusted. – 2) 
Potential GDP, annual change (%), past values calculated on the basis of  level applying the 
Hodrick-Prescott-Filter; as from Q2 2005, estimate ECB Observer. – 3) Stock of money 
M3, annual change in %, seasonally adjusted. – 4) Oil price in US$ (Brent). – 5) EURO-
USD is the euro-US-dollar exchange rate. 
Source: ECB Observer. 
 
4.3.2. – Inflation forecast, 2006-Q4 to 2008-Q4  
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Source: ECB Observer.  
Looking ahead, our inflation forecast model suggests an annual average rise of the 
HICP of 2.3% (including the effect from the German 3pp VAT hike as from 1 Janu-
ary 2007). Of course, the latest pronounced decline in crude oil prices exerts a particu-
larly favourable effect on the short-term dynamics of inflation. For 2008, however, 
average annual HICP inflation should remain at 2.3%, as excessively high money 
growth can be expected to prevent inflation from remaining below 2.0% (see Figure 
4.3.2).   
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Figure 4.3.3. – Credit, money and stock prices 
(a) Bank loan growth (% y/y) and stock markets (b) M3 growth (% y/y) and stock markets
Source:  Bloomberg, own calculations.
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Figure 4.3.4. – M3 and bond market valuation  
(a) M3 growth (% y/y) and 10-year yield (%) (b) Real M3 growth (% y/y) and 10-year yield (%)
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Source: Bloomberg, Thomson Financials; own calculations. 
 
As highlighted in the chapter 4.1 of this report, strong credit and money growth 
has not only been accompanied by rising stock prices (see Figure 4.3.3) but also by de-
clining bond yields (see Figure 4.3.4). In this context one should bear in mind: inflat-
ing asset prices might just be a temporary development – to be followed by a pick-up 
in consumer price inflation and/or emerging problems in the financial sector, once a 
sharp correction in elevated asset price increases sets in.  
It is against this background that we are in strong support for raising the ECB 
main refinancing rates further, bringing the ECB refinancing rate to around 4.0%. 
Under the current official rate level, credit and money supply growth, the drivers of 
(long-run) inflation, can be expected to continue to grow at too rapid a pace: that is 
too rapid for either allowing inflation to slow down to an acceptable level or soothing 
concerns about a forthcoming financial crisis.  
 
[\ 
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APPENDIX 
A.1. – ECB’s assessment according to Monthly Bulletin editorial  
Date Actual infla-
tion 
Inflation 
projections 
Output growth M31) and  Credit ex-
pansion  
Final assessment ECB 
rate2) 
December 
2000 
“… slightly be-
low 2.5% in 
2000.” 
2.3% in 2001 
1.9% in 2002 
“… the short-
term outlook 
points to some 
moderation in 
growth …” Ho-
wever, the under-
lying dynamism 
of growth conti-
nues to prevail.“ 
5.5%  “… a contin-
ued high rate 
of growth in 
credit to the 
private sector 
…” 
 
“… the Governing Council 
judges the risks to price stabil-
ity in the medium term under 
both pillars of the strategy still 
to be on the upside.” 
4.75% 
June 2001 “… inflation 
remains above 
2.0% in 2001 
…” 
“In 2002, infla-
tion is likely to 
fall back below 
2% …”  
 
2.5% in 2001 
1.8% in 2002 
 
Real GDP 
growth in the 
euro area in 2001 
is expected to 
come down from 
the high level 
reached in 2000 
to levels more in 
line with trend 
potential growth 
…” 
4.6% 
“…the indica-
tions from the 
first pillar are 
consistent with 
price stability 
over the me-
dium term.” 
 
“… the an-
nual rate of 
growth of 
credit to the 
private sector 
has continued 
to moderate 
over recent 
months …” 
 
“There is a need to remain 
vigilant as regards develop-
ments affecting the balance of 
risks to price stability.” 
4.50% 
December 
2001 
“… annual in-
flation rates 
have remained 
above 2% dur-
ing most of 
2002 …” 
 
1.8% in 2003 
1.6% in 2004 
“It is expected, 
therefore, that 
economic growth 
will remain sub-
dued in the com-
ing months.” 
 
 
7.1%  
“There is ample 
liquidity in the 
euro area.”  
“… it is unlikely 
at this juncture 
that this will 
translate into 
inflationary 
pressures.” 
“The recent 
moderation 
of the growth 
in loans to 
the private 
sector (…) 
supports this 
assessment.” 
“… the reduction in the key 
ECB interest rates on 5 De-
cember 2002 was guided by 
the assessment that prospects 
have strengthened for infla-
tion to fall below 2% in the 
course of 2003.” 
3.25% 
June 2002  “… inflation fell 
from 2.4% in 
April to 2.0% in 
May 2002. 
However, this 
decline is mainly 
due to a base ef-
fect …” 
2.3% in 2002 
1.9% in 2003 
“Overall, they 
suggest that real 
GDP growth in 
the euro area 
should again be 
in line with po-
tential growth 
later this year.” 
 
7.4%  
“M3 growth still 
partly reflects 
the portfolio 
shifts to M3 …” 
 
“… annual 
growth rates 
of loans to 
the private 
sector have 
stabilised 
over recent 
months.” 
“To avoid inflationary pres-
sure, (…) high wage increases 
must not spread across sectors 
and countries in the euro 
area.” 
3.25% 
December 
2002 
“2002 inflation 
has been rather 
persistent de-
spite the eco-
nomic slow-
down.” 
 
1.8% in 2003 
1.6% in 2004 
“The most likely 
scenario is that 
economic growth 
will gradually re-
cover in the 
course of 2003 
towards rates 
more in line with 
potential.” 
 
7.1%  
“There is ample 
liquidity in the 
euro area. How-
ever, particu-
larly in the light 
of sluggish eco-
nomic growth, 
it is unlikely at 
this juncture 
that this will 
translate into 
inflationary 
pressures.” 
“The recent 
moderation 
of the growth 
in loans to 
the private 
sector (…) 
supports this 
assessment.” 
 
“The key ECB interest rates 
have now reached a very low 
level by historical standards. 
The Governing Council will 
continue to monitor closely all 
factors that may affect the 
prospects for inflation in the 
euro area.” 
2.75% 
June 2003 1.9% in May, 
“annual infla-
tion rates are 
expected to 
hover broadly 
around this 
level for the 
remainder of 
2003 and to fall 
significantly in 
2004.” 
2.0% in 2003 
1.3% in 2004 
“… the latest 
data releases on 
real GDP growth 
have confirmed 
that economic ac-
tivity in the euro 
area remained 
subdued …” 
 
8.7% 
“… growth in 
the broad 
monetary aggre-
gate M3 re-
mained strong. 
Consequently, 
the euro area 
economy has 
continued to 
accumulate li-
quidity signifi-
cantly above the 
amount needed 
to sustain non-
inflationary 
growth.” 
“… loans to 
the private 
sector in-
creased at a 
much more 
moderate 
pace than 
M3.”  
 
“… the economic analysis in-
dicates that inflation rates 
should decline to below 2% 
over the medium term (…). 
The monetary analysis indi-
cates that the strong expan-
sion of M3 should not, for the 
time being, adversely affect 
this outlook.” 
2.0% 
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APPENDIX  
A.1. – ECB’s assessment according to Monthly Bulletin editorial (cont’d)  
Date Actual infla-
tion 
Inflation 
projections 
Output growth M31) and  Credit expan-
sion  
Final assessment Rate2) 
December 
2003 
2.2% in No-
vember, 
”… inflation 
rates are likely 
to fluctuate 
around 2% 
over the com-
ing months, a 
gradual and 
limited decline 
in inflation 
should take 
place later on.” 
1.8% in 
2004 
1.6% in 
2005 
“… euro area 
economic growth 
is likely to gradu-
ally recover over 
the next quarters, 
leading to a 
broader and 
stronger upswing 
in the course of 
next year and the 
year after.” 
7.5% 
“… should high 
excess liquidity 
continue to 
prevail once 
there is a sig-
nificant 
strengthening 
of economic ac-
tivity, it could 
lead to infla-
tionary pres-
sures in the 
medium term.” 
 
“The low level 
of interest rates 
has also sup-
ported the 
growth of credit 
demand.” 
 
“… the economic analysis in-
dicates that the main scenario 
for price developments (…) 
continues to be in line with 
the definition of price stabil-
ity. This picture is confirmed 
by cross-checking with the 
monetary analysis.” 
2.0% 
June 2004 2.5% in May;  
“… these fac-
tors (…) 
should bring 
annual rates of 
consumer price 
inflation back 
to below 2% in 
2005.” 
“… there has 
been an in-
crease in meas-
ures of long-
term inflation 
expectations 
(…). … the re-
cent upward 
trend calls for 
particular vigi-
lance.” 
2.1% in 2004 
1.7% in 2005 
 
“… the recovery 
in euro area eco-
nomic growth is 
expected to con-
tinue over the 
coming quarters, 
leading to a 
broader and 
stronger upswing 
in the course of 
next year.” 
5.2% 
“…the low 
level of interest 
rates continues 
to fuel mone-
tary growth and 
the amount of 
excess liquidity 
remains high in 
the euro area.” 
No mentioning  “… the economic analysis in-
dicates that the main scenario 
for the outlook for price de-
velopments (…) remains in 
line with price stability. 
Cross-checking with the 
monetary analysis also sup-
ports the case for vigilance 
with regard to the materialisa-
tion of risks to price stabil-
ity.” 
2.0% 
September 
2004 
Looking ahead, 
however, there 
are no indica-
tions at present 
of stronger un-
derlying infla-
tionary pres-
sures building 
up domesti-
cally.” 
2.2% in 2004 
1.8% in 2005 
“Looking ahead, 
the conditions 
for a continua-
tion of the re-
covery remain in 
place.” 
 
5.7% 
“M3 growth 
remains resil-
ient.” 
“There remains 
substantially 
more liquidity 
in the euro area 
than is needed 
to finance non-
inflationary 
growth.” 
 
“The low level of 
interest rates also 
seems to be fuel-
ling the growth 
of loans to the 
private sector 
…” 
 
“… while the economic 
analysis indicates that pros-
pects are consistent with 
price stability (…), a number 
of upside risks need to be 
carefully monitored. Cross-
checking with the monetary 
analysis also supports the 
case for strong vigilance with 
regard to the materialisation 
of risks to price stability.” 
2.0% 
December 
2004 
“The short-
term outlook 
for inflation 
remains worri-
some.” 
 
2.2% in 2004 
2.0% in 2005 
1.6% in 2005 
“The available 
survey informa-
tion for October 
and November 
points to ongo-
ing growth in the 
fourth quarter, 
albeit at a more 
moderate pace 
than in the first 
half of this 
year.” 
6.1% 
“As a result of 
the persistently 
high growth in 
M3 over the 
past few years, 
there remains 
substantially 
more liquidity 
in the euro area 
than is needed 
to finance non-
inflationary 
economic 
growth. This 
could pose 
risks to price 
stability over 
the medium 
term.”  
 
“Growth in loans 
to nonfinancial 
corporations has 
picked up further 
in recent 
months.” 
 
“… the economic analysis 
suggests that underlying do-
mestic inflationary pressures 
are contained, but a number 
of medium-term upside risks 
to price stability need to be 
monitored closely. Cross-
checking with the monetary 
analysis supports the case for 
continued vigilance with re-
gard to the materialisation of 
risks to price stability (…).” 
 
2.0% 
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APPENDIX  
A.1. – ECB’s assessment according to Monthly Bulletin editorial (cont’d) 
Date Actual infla-
tion 
Inflation pro-
jections1) 
Output growth M32)  Credit expan-
sion 
Final assessment Rate3) 
March 
2005 
“In the coming 
months, an-
nual inflation 
rates are likely 
to fluctuate 
around 2%.” 
1.9% in 2005 
1.6% in 2006 
“There are a num-
ber of reasons why 
the weaker real 
GDP growth in the 
second half of 
2004 could be a 
transitory phe-
nomenon.” 
6.6% 
“The latest 
monetary data 
confirm the 
strengthening 
of M3 growth 
observed since 
mid-2004.” 
There is “sub-
stantially more 
liquidity in the 
euro area ex-
ists than is 
needed to fi-
nance non-
inflationary 
economic 
growth.”  
“The exception-
ally low level of 
real interest 
rates is also fur-
ther stimulating 
private sector 
demand for 
credit.” 
 
“… the economic analysis 
confirms that underlying 
domestic inflationary pres-
sures remain contained, 
while medium-term upside 
risks to price stability exist 
and will be monitored 
closely. Cross-checking 
with the monetary analysis 
supports the case for con-
tinued vigilance with re-
gard to the materialisation 
of risks to price stability … 
.” 
2.0% 
June 2005 “Over the com-
ing months, 
annual HICP in-
flation rates are 
expected to 
remain broadly 
around current 
levels.”  
 
2.0% for 2005, 
1.5% for 2006 
“Most recent indica-
tors for economic 
activity remain, on 
balance, on the 
downside.“ 
 
7.2% 
“… the in-
creasingly liq-
uid nature of 
monetary ex-
pansion, the 
accumulated 
stock of the 
broad mone-
tary aggregate 
M3 may entail 
upside risks to 
price stability 
over the me-
dium to longer 
term.” 
“… the euro area 
private sector’s 
demand for MFI 
loans, in particu-
lar for  house 
purchase, has re-
mained strong.” 
“… the economic analysis 
suggests that underlying do-
mestic inflationary pressures 
remain contained in the me-
dium term. At the same time, 
it is necessary to underline 
the conditionality of this as-
sessment and the related up-
side risks to price stability. 
Cross-checking with the 
monetary analysis supports 
the case for ongoing vigi-
lance.” 
 
2.0% 
September 
2005 
“Over the next 
few months, 
annual HICP in-
flation rates are 
expected to 
fluctuate 
around current 
levels, mainly 
due to recent 
developments in 
oil prices.” 
 
2.2% for 2005 
1.9% for 2006 
“The most recent 
survey indicators 
have, on balance, 
been supportive to 
the view that eco-
nomic growth could 
improve in the sec-
ond half of 2005, 
while higher oil 
prices continue to 
weigh on demand 
and confidence.” 
n/a 
“The liquidity 
situation in the 
euro area re-
mains ample by 
all plausible 
measures, indi-
cating risks to 
price stability 
over medium 
to longer hori-
zons.”  
 
“Low interest 
rates are also fuel-
ling credit 
expansion, with 
the strengthening 
of the demand for 
loans  broadly 
based across the 
private sector. 
The growth of 
mortgage 
borrowing re-
mains very 
strong. In this 
context, price dy-
namics in the 
housing markets 
need to be moni-
tored closely.” 
 
“…the balance of risks to 
the baseline inflation sce-
nario is tilted to the upside. 
Cross-checking the eco-
nomic analysis with the 
monetary analysis confirms 
the need for particular vigi-
lance in order to keep me-
dium-term inflation expecta-
tions firmly anchored at lev-
els consistent with price 
stability.” 
 
2.0% 
December 
2005 
“It is likely that 
annual HICP in-
flation rates will 
remain elevated 
in the short 
term.” 
 
2.2% for 2005 
2.1% for 2006 
2.0% for 2007 
 “… the outlook for 
economic activity 
remains subject to 
downward 
risks, relating mainly 
to higher than ex-
pected oil prices, 
concerns about 
global imbalances 
and weak consumer 
confidence.” 
 
7.3%  
“Liquidity in 
the euro area is 
ample by all 
plausible meas-
ures. The 
strengthening 
of monetary 
growth ob-
served since 
mid-2004 has 
gained further 
momentum 
over the past 
months.” 
 
“Furthermore, 
the growth of 
borrowing – es-
pecially mortgage 
loans – 
remains very ro-
bust. In this con-
text, price dynam-
ics in a number of 
housing markets 
need to be moni-
tored closely.” 
 
“… increased risks to price 
stability identified by the 
economic analysis have been 
confirmed by cross-checking 
with the monetary analysis. 
An adjustment of the ECB’s 
monetary 
policy stance was therefore 
warranted.”  
 
2.25% 
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APPENDIX  
A.1. – ECB’s assessment according to Monthly Bulletin editorial (cont’d) 
Date Actual infla-
tion 
Inflation pro-
jections1) 
Output growth M32)  Credit expansion Final assessment Rate3) 
March 
2006 
“In the short 
run, inflation 
rates are likely 
to remain at 
above 2%, with 
the precise lev-
els depending 
strongly on fu-
ture energy 
price develop-
ments, 
 
2.2% for 2006 
2.2% for 2007 
“…the condi-
tions remain in 
place for ongo-
ing economic 
expansion …. 
 
8.5%  
“Looking through 
the short-term ef-
fects generated by 
such portfolio be-
haviour, the trend 
rate of monetary 
expansion remains 
strong, reflecting 
the stimulative im-
pact of the low 
level of interest 
rates.” 
“… growth rate of 
credit to the private 
sector has strength-
ened further over 
recent months, with 
borrowing by 
households – espe-
cially loans for 
house purchase – 
and non-financial 
corporations rising 
at a marked 
pace.” 
“… inflation rates are pro-
jected to remain elevated in 
2006 and 2007, and the eco-
nomic analysis indicates that 
risks to price stability over 
the medium term remain on 
the upside.” 
 
2.50% 
June 2006 “… In the 
months to come 
and in 2007, in-
flation rates are 
likely to remain 
above 2%, the 
precise levels 
depending on 
future energy 
price develop-
ments.” 
 
2.3% for 2006 
2.2% for 2007 
“… the condi-
tions remain in 
place for the 
euro area econ-
omy to continue 
growing at 
around the po-
tential rate.” 
 
8.5%  
“… the latest de-
velopments con-
firm that the 
stimulative impact 
of the low level of 
interest rates  re-
mains the domi-
nant factor behind 
the current high 
trend rate of 
monetary expan-
sion.” 
“… The further ac-
celeration of mone-
tary and credit 
growth in this envi-
ronment of already 
ample liquidity 
points to increased 
upside risks to price 
stability at longer 
horizons.” 
 
“… inflation rates are pro-
jected to remain elevated in 
2006 and 2007, with risks to 
this outlook on the upside. 
Given the strength 
of monetary and credit 
growth and the ample liquid-
ity situation, a cross-check of 
the outcome of the eco-
nomic analysis with that of 
the monetary analysis con-
firms that upside risks to 
price stability over the me-
dium term prevail.” 
2.75%  
September 
2006 
“… inflation 
rates are likely 
to remain above 
2%, the precise 
levels depending 
on future energy 
price develop-
ments. “ 
2.4% for 2006 
2.4% for 2007 
“… the condi-
tions remain in 
place for the 
euro area econ-
omy to continue 
growing at 
around the po-
tential rate.” 
 
8.5% 
“… liquidity in the 
euro area remains 
ample by all rea-
sonable measures.” 
 
“Continued strong 
monetary and credit 
growth in the con-
text of already am-
ple liquidity points 
to upside risks to 
price stability over 
the medium to 
longer term.” 
 
“… inflation rates are pro-
jected to remain elevated in 
2006 and 2007, with risks to 
this outlook continuing to be 
clearly on the upside. Given 
the ongoing dynamism of 
monetary and credit growth 
in an environment of already 
ample liquidity, … upside 
risks to price stability prevail 
over the medium term.” 
 
2.75% 
Source: European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletins. – 1) Mid points. – 2) Numbers refer to the average growth rate of the last three 
months. – 3) Up to 21 June 2000, rate of the fixed rate tender; from 28 June 2000, rate of the variable rate tender at minimum bid 
rate.  
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